Sathish Ninan, J.

Which is the court that will have territorial jurisdiction to entertain an application under S.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the Arbitration Act”), is the short question that arises for determination.

2. In Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd. (2017 (2) KLT 665 (SC)), the Apex Court held thus:

“ ..... the moment the seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause...”

The Apex Court was referring to the seat of arbitration, and held that the seat of arbitration decides the territorial jurisdiction of the courts which will have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain applications regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the parties. The Apex Court directed the application under S.9 of the Arbitration Act, which was the subject matter therein, to be filed in the court where the seat of arbitration is situated.

3. Section 42 of the Act which deals with jurisdiction, reads thus:

“42. Jurisdiction.- Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this Part has been made in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.”

The terms “subsequent applications arising out of that agreement” appearing in the Section was interpreted by the Apex Court in State of West Bengal and Others v. Associated Contractors ((2015) 1 SCC 32) to hold that it refers to applications under Section 34 also. The Apex Court at paragraph 25 held thus:

“(b) The expression “with respect to an arbitration agreement” makes it clear that Section 42 will apply to all applications made whether before or during arbitral proceedings or after an award is pronounced under Part I of the 1996 Act.

(d) Section 9 applications being applications made to a court and Section 34 applications to set aside arbitral awards are applications which are within Section 42.”

Therefore, if the seat of the arbitration is determinative regarding the court in which an application under S.9 of the Act is to be filed, then the same would follow in the case of an application under S.34 of the Act also. This is all the more so in view of S.34(4) of the Act which reads thus:

“On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of the arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award.”

Thereunder power is given for the court to adjourn the proceedings giving the Arbitral Tribunal opportunity to resume the proceedings for the purposes enumerated therein. So also, it is relevant to note that powers are conferred on the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act to pass interim directions even after passing of the award but before it is enforced. Here it would be relevant to refer to S.17 of the Act which reads thus:

“17. Interim measures ordered by arbitral tribunal.—(1) A party may, during the arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to the arbitral tribunal—

(i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or

(ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:—

(a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement;

(b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration;

(c) the detention, preservation or in