1. The revision petitioner challenges the order of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Palakkad in MC.No.173/2014, by which he was directed to pay maintenance to his wife and children, in an application filed under section 12 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as DV Act).

2. The first respondent herein who is admittedly the wife of the revision petitioner filed the application contending that the revision petitioner harassed her mentally and physically and refused to maintain her and two children. It was alleged that he had committed acts of domestic violence. She claimed maintenance @ Rs.5000/- for herself and for each of the child. The revision petitioner appeared and contended that he was aged 63 years, that he was thrown out of the house and that he had no sufficient income to maintain wife and children. It was also contended that the first respondent herein was employed as an LIC agent and also as a sales officer in a jewellery. The elder daughter used to take tuition and earned more than Rs.20,000/- every month.

3. Both sides let in evidence to prove the rival claims. The court below, on an evaluation of the available materials concluded that the first respondent was unable to maintain herself and the children and directed the revision petitioner to pay maintenance @ Rs.3000/- each to the wife and the first child and Rs.1000/- to the second child. Aggrieved by the above order, the revision petitioner has preferred this revision.

4. Heard both sides and examined the records.

5. Three specific contentions were raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner. The first contention was that both the children have attained the age of majority and they did not fall within the definition of child as contemplated under the Domestic Violence Act. It was further contended that the elder child attained the age of majority even at the time of institution of the proceedings and the second child attained majority during the subsistence of the application. Hence it was contended that they were not entitled for maintenance. It was secondly contended that since they had attained the age of majority, they ought to have been made as party to the proceedings independently. On the other hand, the mother sought maintenance on behalf of the children. The third contention set up by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that evidence on record showed that the first respondent was earning some income, which was not disclosed in the application for maintenance. It was contended that since she had sufficient means, the revision petitioner was not obliged to maintain the wife.

6. The learned counsel for the first respondent referred to the definition of the child as available under section 2 (b) of the Domestic Violence Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the first respondent was that though the definition of child meant any person below the age of eighteen years and included any adopted, step or foster child, it was subject to the opening words in section 2 that “In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires”. It was contended that in the light of above, the term child should obtain a liberal interpretation and explanation, in the context in which it was used. The learned counsel, in this regard, invited my attention to section 3 (b), section 20 and section 21 (v) of the Hindu Maintenance and Adoptions Act. It was contended that the term maintenance in section 3 (b) of the said Act also included, in the case of an unmarried daughter, reasonable expenses of incident to her marriage. It was contended by the learned counsel that section 20 of the Hindu Maintenance and Adoptions Act, referred to the maintenance of children and aged parents. Under section 20 (3), an obligation was cast on a person to maintain his unmarried daughter, who was unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property.

7. The learned counsel relied on the decision of this court