A. Muhamed Mustaque, J.

This Writ Appeal is referred to the Full Bench by a Division Bench doubting the correctness of the judgment of a Division Bench in Sudhakaran v. Pallichal Grama Panchayat, 2016 (2) KLT 175.

2. The matter raises a point of construction of provisions related to deemed licence under S.236(3) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, (hereafter referred to as the Act, for short).

3. The appellants before the Division Bench are the petitioners in the Writ Petition. They submitted an application for building permit on 07.02.2018. The Panchayath noted certain defects in the application and returned the application on 12.02.2018. The resubmitted application was again returned before the expiry of 30 days. However, no order was passed within 30 days on the application.

4. The petitioners approached this Court seeking a writ of mandamus directing the Secretary of the Panchayath to issue building permit based on the ‘deemed permit’ under S.236(3) of the Act. According to the petitioners, the Panchayath having failed to disapprove the building permit within a period of 30 days of submitting an application, a deemed permit would come into existence on expiry of such 30 days.

5. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Rajesh Ramachandran v. Corporation of Trivandrum, 2008 (3) KLT 419 interpreted the provisions under the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 in regard to deemed permit, opining that if an application for licence is not rejected and communicated within 30 days, a deemed permit would come into existence even in a circumstance where the applicant was intimated about the defect in the application, within 30 days. The Division Bench approved the dictum in Rajesh Ramachandran’s case in Sudhakaran’s case (supra) without noticing the distinguishing facts involved in both the cases. The factual circumstances involved in Sudhakaran’s case would go to show that it was not a case where the application was found defective and the applicant was intimated about the defects in the application within 30 days. Though the facts involved in Sudhakaran’s case is different, the Division Bench approved that dictum in Rajesh Ramachandran’s case. It is to be noted that the Division Bench which heard the matter in Sudhakaran’s case was on a reference from the learned Single Judge who did not agree with the interpretation of the law in Rajesh Ramachandran’s case.

6. We find the Division Bench, in the factual circumstances of that case, was right in regard to the interpretation of relevant provisions regarding deemed licence in as much as that the Panchayath did not issue any communication to the applicant within 30 days in regard to the application for the licence. We find at the same time the Division Bench erred in approving the dictum in Rajesh Ramachandran’s case for the reasons stated hereafter.

7. We find that the facts involved in Rajesh Ramachandran’s case and in the instant case are almost similar for the decision on the question of law involved. In both the cases, the application was found defective and communication was issued to the applicant before the expiry of 30 days.

8. It is appropriate to refer the deeming provision as referred in S.236(3) of the Act. It reads thus:

“236. General provisions regarding licences and permissions.-

(1) .....

(2) .....

(3) Save as aforesaid, if orders on application for any such licence or permission are not communicated to the applicant within thirty days or such longer period as may be prescribed in any class of cases after the receipt of the application by the Secretary, the application shall be deemed to have been allowed for the period, if any, for which it would have been ordinarily allowed and subject to the law, rules and bye-laws and all conditions ordinarily imposed”.

9. A deeming provision is based on legal fiction for attaining a desired legal consequence. Therefore it will have to be strictly interpreted. It becomes operational only upon such factors as referred and exist under the stat