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1955 Supreme(Ker) 179

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA
K.T. Koshi, Vithayathil, N. Varadaraja Iyengar, JJ.
Korah Punnen – Appellant
Vs.
Parameswara Kurup Vasudeva Kurup – Respondent
A.S. No. 647 of 1953
Decided On : 27-07-1955

JUDGMENT

Joseph Vithayathil, J.

1. The defendants are the appellants. The appeal is from the decision of M.S. Menon, J., in Second Appeal No. 953 of 1952 of this Court and was filed with leave granted by him. The Division Bench before which the appeal came up for hearing referred it to a Full Bench by the following Order of Reference:-

"The questions of law raised in this appeal are of great importance and far-reaching consequences. The decree that is sought to be enforced against the appellants is based on a compromise entered into between the defendants and the plaintiffs in O.S. No. 191 of 1123 on the file of the District Munsiff's Court at Kottayam. In execution the defendants claimed the benefits of the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950. The decree-holders maintained that the undertakings embodied in the compromise petition amount to a waiver by these tenants of the benefits which they could have availed of under the Rent Control Order and that, therefore, they cannot now invoke the aid of that Order. This contention was upheld in the decision appealed against and in doing so the decision of this Court in I.L.R. 1953 Travancore-Cochin 30 was followed. That decision in a way supports the decree-holders' contention. All the same, it cannot be denied that there is considerable force in the appellants' contention that the facts of that case are clearly distinguished from the fact of the present case. It is also argued that even with out any pronouncement on the questions of waiver and estoppel the decision in that case would be rested on the other aspects peculiar to that case. In the present case the questions of waiver and estoppel directly arise for decision. On these questions the view taken in I.L.R. 1953 T.C. 30 does not appear to be absolutely in favour of the extreme position contended for on behalf of the decree-holders. It has only been stated that under certain circumstances there could be a waiver of special statutory rights conferred on particular class of persons for their own benefit. On behalf of the appellants the extreme position taken is that there could be no such waiver at all. Different aspects of this question have been considered in a series of decisions by Indian High Courts and also by English Courts. It cannot be said that there has been unanimity in the views as expressed in these decisions. We think that it is very desirable that the different aspects of the points raised in this appeal are fully examined and an authoritative ruling given by a Full Bench of this Court on the question as to whether there could be a waiver of the rights conferred by the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order and if so to what extent and under what circumstances. Accordingly we refer this case for decision by a Full Bench.

Sd/- K. Sankaran, J.

Sd/- P.K. Subramonia Iyer, J."

2. The suit was instituted on 8.5.1123 by the original plaintiff, who is now dead, against the first defendant, the Managing Director of a company known as Punnan and Kurup (India) Limited, for recovery of a building with arrears of rent. The second defendant-company-was subsequently impleaded in the suit. After the death of the original plaintiff, plaintiffs 2 to 4, her legal representatives, continued the suit. When the suit was instituted the Travancore Buildings Rent Control Order, 1122 was in force. It was alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of the building as she required it for her own residence, as the rent was in default from Chingom 1123 onwards and as the defendant had denied the title of the plaintiff in the reply notice sent by him on 3.1.1123. The first defendant contended that the plaintiff had no title to the building and to the property in which it was situated and that they had been sold to him by the original owner thereof. The second defendant-company-also raised the same contentions. The suit was subsequently compromised by the parties and a compromise petitio

















































































































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