1. A decree for specific performance of contract for sale put in execution. During the course of execution steps were taken to get delivery of possession of property. It was obstructed at first on 5/12/2007 and thereafter on 11/03/2008. The decree holder thereon filed E.A.No.201/2008 on 1/4/2008 to remove the obstruction. It was allowed. It was taken up in appeal in A.S.No.64/2008 before the Sub Court, Hosdurg, but the Appellate Court concurred with the order passed by the execution court by dismissing the appeal on 28/2/2009, against which the obstructor came up with this second appeal.

2. There is no much dispute with respect to the passing of a decree for specific performance of contract for sale of immovable property having an extent of two acres. The obstructor/the appellant is a subsequent purchaser of the property having an extent of one acre out of the large extent of two acres under Ext.B1 document dated 21/11/1995. It was purchased during the pendency of the second appeal pertaining to the decree passed for specific performance. The contention raised by the appellants/the obstructors is that they had purchased the property having an extent of one acre without noticing the pendency of litigation and they were totally unaware of the proceedings. Subsequent to the purchase they took possession and made improvements by constructing building therein.

3. Both the execution court and the First Appellate Court rejected the contention raised by the appellant being a pendente lite transferee, he is bound by the decree, as the transfer was effected during the pendency of the second appeal/pending litigation.

4. Inter alia it was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the decree for specific performance which was put in execution does not contain any relief granting recovery of possession of the property in question. No relief of recovery of possession was incorporated in the suit and no decree for possession was passed. It was submitted that unless there is a decree for recovery of possession it is not at all permissible to execute the decree by delivering possession of property. Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, was brought to the notice of this court and took support from the two decisions of Apex Court in Babu Lal v. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal (AIR 1982 SC 818), and Adcon Electronic Pvt.Ltd. v. Daulat & Anr (2001 SAR(Civil) 806). It was also contented that there is no application of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act as the suit for specific performance is not a suit for land.

5. The questions came up for consideration are:

1. A mere decree for specific performance of contract for sale of immovable property can be put in execution to recover possession in the absence of specific relief granting recovery? Is there any difference in the legal position, when possession of diverted to a person, who is not bound by the contract for sale?

2. What is the application of Section 22 of Specific Relief Act, when the decree was put in execution in the absence of specific relief granting recovery. Can the execution court recover possession in execution of decree granting specific performance or the plaintiff has to go for a suit for recovery of possession based on the title derived under the decree?

3. A suit for specific performance of contract for sale of immovable property would come under the purview of expression “suit for land” and what would be the impact of Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, on a pendente lite transferee, when the suit resulted in a decree granting specific performance?

6. Admittedly, no relief was sought in the suit for recovery of possession of property which is the subject matter of the contract for sale and no decree was granted for recovery of possession. The main contention raised is that a suit for specific performance is not a 'suit for land' and as such, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application. A suit or proceeding in which a right to immovable p