The interpretation of the word 'of' in S.20(2) and the rule that posting the application by registered post constitutes making the application as contemplated under the Act.

Admittedly the application under S.20 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 reached the Collector’s Office only on 6-3-1974, when it was received on his behalf. That application was posted on 5-3-1974 and sent by registered post acknowledgement due. The application as aforesaid was sent pursuant to receipt of notice issued under S.12 (2) of the Act informing about the award passed on 19-12-1973. There is dispute between the parties as to when the notice issued under S.12 (2) of the Act was received by the petitioner, on 22-1-1974 as averred in the counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents or on 24-1-1974 as stated by the petitioner. The endorsement on he return of the notice appears to bear the date 22-1-1974 and therefore I will proceed in this case on that basis. The question raised is as to whether the petitioner who has received the notice issued under S.12 (2) of the Act on 22-1-1974 was within time in making the application for reference by sending the same by registered post on 5-3-1974, which no doubt reached, the Collectorate only the next day, 6-3-1974.

2. It is common case that if the application was received in the Collectorate on 4-3-1974 it would have been in time. It is the case of the learned Government Pleader that reckoning time from 22-1-1974 and counting that day also the application should have been made on 4-3-1974. I do not think that the learned Government Pleader is correct when he submits that 22-1-1974, namely the date on which the notice was served on the petitioner, should also be taken into account in computing the period of limitation of six weeks under S.20 (2) (b) of the Act. Under S 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 corresponding to S.8 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125, it is sufficient for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time to use the word “from”. Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of S.20 says that the application shall be made to the Collector within six weeks of the receipt of the notice by the applicant. It goes without saying that the word “of” means “from” or in other words the said clause means that the application shall be made within six weeks from the date of receipt of the notice. So construed so far as the case on hand is concerned, 22-1-1974 has to be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under the aforesaid provision. If that be so, the application has to be made on 5-3-1974.

3. The further question is whether by posting the application on 5-3-1974 it could be said that an application has been made as contemplated by S.20(2) of the Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the decision of the Madras High Court in Ranganathan v. R.D. Officer (A.I.R. 1972 Madras 7) and the Allahabad High Court in Satish Chandra Gupta v. Commr. of Sales Tax (1971-28 S.T.C.740) submits that it is sufficient that the application is posted. The submission is that an application posted on 5-3-1974 is an application made as contemplated under S.20(2) of the Act.

4. Pointing out that the Act nowhere states that the application shall be “presented” in person to the Acquisition Officer and that the expression used is general: “Application shall be made” the Madras High Court in the first mentioned decision held as follows:

“So long as the law permits an application to be sent by post, it should be deemed that the moment an application is posted, it is an application made on that date, and the fact that the application reached the other side some days later cannot make it an application made after the due date”.

The aforesaid case was decided with reference to the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and S.18 (2) of that Act which corresponds to S.20 of the Act.

5. Construing the word “sent” in the expression “sent by registered post” in R.67 (1) of the U. P. Sales Tax Rules, 1948 the Allahabad High Court in Satish Chandra Gupta v. Commr. of Sales Tax (1971 28 S. T. C. 740) observed:

“The mere fact of duly h