The main legal point established in the judgment is that the State Legislature had the competence to legislate the procedure to be followed in the High Court, and the amendment by Act I of 1952 was within the competency of the State Legislature. The court also found that Act I of 1952 was valid as it had received the assent of the President and the Rajpramukh. The court further held that the amendment affecting the procedure to be followed in the High Court applied to all proceedings pending in the High Court.

K.S. Govinda Pillai, J.

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4. Defendants 3 to 7 have joined hands with the 1st defendant and preferred this appeal against the decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs. This appeal was valued at 31560 fanams. The plaintiffs had filed a cross-appeal claiming the share of their mother-the 2nd defendant - also in the suit. This cross appeal was valued at 3945 fanams. Thus the value of the appeal and cross-appeal came to over 35,000 fanams and under the Travancore High Court Act which was in force at the time when this appeal was filed, it was to be heard by a Full Bench of not less than three Judges. When this appeal was heard by us on 6.3.1952, the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act I of 1952 had been passed. By this amendment, the provision for hearing appeals of the value of Rs. 5000/- and above, as mentioned in S. 25 of the High Court Act of 1125, had been deleted.

5. The respondents’ learned Advocate therefore raised a preliminary objection that we had no jurisdiction to hear this appeal as the rights of the parties to have the appeal heard and decided by a Full Bench of not less than three Judges was a vested one, and that such right could not be taken away by a later legislation which had no retrospective effect or at any rate which purported to have no retrospective effect. The appellants’ learned Advocate further stated that Act I of 1952 was not assented to by His Highness the Rajpramukh, and that therefore it could not be deemed to be a valid Act of legislation. We shall record our decision on this preliminary point before we proceed to consider the appeal on the merits.

6. Entry 78 in List I (Union List) in the seventh schedule to the Constitution of India reserved “Constitution and organisation of the High Courts except provisions as to officers and servants of High Court; persons entitled to practise before the High Courts” for legislation by the Parliament. The State Legislatures could pass the necessary law regarding other matters. (Vide entry No. 3 in the State List and No. 13 in the concurrent list). There can therefore be no doubt that the State Legislature can legislate the procedure to be followed in the High Court as to the filing and disposal of appeals etc., there. The present Act I of 1952 amending the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act of 1125, to make provision for regulating the business in the High Court, is within the competency of the State Legislature. Under Art. 200 of the Constitution of India, when a Bill has been passed by the State Legislature, it shall be presented to the Rajpramukh and the latter shall declare that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President. When a Bill is reserved for the consideration of the President, the President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom. Act I of 1952 was published in the gazette (Supplement) of 22.1.1952 with the notification that the Act of the Travancore-Cochin Legislature had received the assent of the President on the 8th January 1952. This is published with a notification to that effect issued by the order of His Highness the Rajpramukh when assent to the Act was given by the President (vide Art. 255). The notification issued by the order of His Highness the Rajpramukh shows that the Bill in question had been reserved for the assent by the President, and this implies the declaration contemplated in Art. 200. The Act was therefore valid.

7. As to the question whether appeals which were provided for being heard by a Bench of not less than three Judges could be heard by a lesser number of Judges, there is no doubt that a right of appeal provided for by the Civil Procedure Code is a vested right that could not be defeated by a subsequent legislation. The rulings in Colonial Sugar Refining Company, Limited v. Irving (1905 A.C. 369), Kripa Singh v. Rasalldar Ajaipal Singh (A.I.R. 1928 Lah. 627) and