THOTTATHIL B. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.

1. Is an aided college in the State of Kerala “a public authority” as defined in S.2(h)(d) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, for short, the “RTI Act”? This has been answered in the affirmative as per the impugned judgment [Ed. Note: Reported in 2007 (3) KLT 486 (Varghese v. M.G. University)]. Hence, these Writ Appeals.

2. Adverting to the preamble to the RTI Act, the learned Judge held that it is abundantly clear that the scope of the Act is much wider in its applicability than getting confined to Governments and their instrumentalities and that the Act is intended to harmonise the conflict between the right of the citizens to secure access to information and the necessity to preserve confidentiality of sensitive information. Noticing that even the preamble states that the Act is intended to provide the practical regime of right to information in order to promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority, it has been held that in terms of Ss.3 and 4, the public authorities are obliged to supply information. Considering the definition of ‘public authority’ in S.2(h), it has been laid down that on the basis of the undisputed facts regarding the control and funding of the aided private colleges after the introduction of the Direct Payment Scheme, such an institution falls within the definition of the term ‘public authority’ notwithstanding whether it may, or not, be ‘State’ within Art.12 of the Constitution. It was specifically held that the Act is not confined to bodies answering the definition of ‘State’ under Art.12, which definition primarily governs enforcement of fundamental rights. Holding that the Act is intended at achieving the object of providing an effective framework for effectuating the right to information recognised under Art.19 of the Constitution, it has been held that aided private colleges in the State of Kerala fall within the term ‘public authority’ in the RTI Act.

Contentions and arguments of appellants

3. On behalf of the appellants, Adv.A.N.Rajan Babu argued that the RTI Act, though intended to facilitate proper dissemination of information, the definition of “public authority” in S.2 (h) of that Act cannot take in a body or institution unless it is one established or constituted as envisaged by sub-cls.(a) to (d) of S.2(h). It is argued that the inclusive component in the said definition clause has no sweeping effect, but has to get confined to instrumentalities of the Government, having regard to the long title and preamble to the RTI Act expressing the predominant intention that the said legislation is brought in, among other things, to hold Governments and their instrumentalities accountable to the governed. It was accordingly argued that the concept of “instrumentality” as falling within the definition of “public authority” has to be understood as only instrumentalities of the Governments and hence, such an instrumentality, to be treated as public authority for the purpose of the RTI Act, has to be one over which the appropriate Government has a deep and pervasive control. Accordingly, it was argued that if the institution is not an instrumentality in terms of Art.12 of the Constitution of India, it cannot be brought within the definition of public authority under the RTI Act. Ajay v. Hasia Khalid Mujub (AIR 1981 SC 487) was pressed into service to describe the sweep of the definition of “State” in Art.12 of the Constitution.

4. Dilating on the scope of the definition clause, namely, S.2(h), the learned counsel for the appellants argued that though the said clause uses the legislative device ‘means’ and ‘includes’, the inclusiveness provided thereby does not enlarge the scope of the earlier limb of the definition in as much as what is added on as inclusions should be read by applying the rule of construction: noscitur a sociis, which means that the meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps and that the principle