IMPORTANT POINTS
The ratio in Mukri Gopalan’s case does not square with the observations of the three Judge bench in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises’s case as the latter decision unequivocally held that the Limitation Act will not apply to quasi- judicial bodies or tribunals. According to the decision in M.P.Steel Corporation to that extend Mukri Gopalan is in conflict with the judgment in the Consolidated Engineering Enterprises. On a close reading of the decisions in Mukri Gopalan’s case and M.P.Steel Corporation’s case, we do not find any reason to hold that in M.P. Steel Corporation the propositions laid down in Mukri Gopalan, that the District Judges, functioning under Section 18 of the Act as appellate authorities, are District Judges as such and not persona designata, are in anyway affected. It is clearly mentioned in M.P Steel Corporation that the fact that a District Judge himself happened to be the appellate authority under the Act would have been sufficient for the Limitation Act to apply without going into the proposition that the Limitation Act could apply to Tribunals too.

ORDER

A. Hariprasad, J.

Common challenge in the captioned cases is against the ratio in Ratheesh v. A.M.Chacko and another, 2018(5) KHC 35 rendered by a Division Bench of this Court, wherein it is held that the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short ‘the Limitation Act’) is not applicable to the proceedings before the Rent Control Court, constituted under S.3 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (in short ‘the Act’).

2. We heard the learned counsel, who challenge the ratio in Ratheesh’s case (supra) as well as those learned counsel, who support the ratio.

3. Before going into various legal issues raised, we shall first consider the facts in Ratheesh’s case. First respondent in Ratheesh’s case filed an eviction petition before the Rent Control Court, seeking eviction of the second respondent from three rooms. The petitioner before this Court is the second respondent, who suffered an ex parte order of eviction at the hands of the Rent Control Court. He moved an application to get the ex parte order set aside as per R.13(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979 (in short ‘the Rules’). The application should have been filed within 15 days from the date of order. In Ratheesh’s case, the application for setting aside the ex parte order was filed beyond the prescribed time and therefore an application for condonation of delay was also filed under S.5 of the Limitation Act. It was contended before the Rent Control Court that S.5 of the Limitation Act could not be applied in a proceeding before the Rent Control Court. That contention was accepted in the light of the ratio in M.P Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise (2015) 7 SCC 58). In the appellate court also, the second respondent did not succeed. Hence, he approached this Court with a Rent Control Revision. Here, ratio in Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker (1995) 5 SCC 5) was considered. In that case, the Apex Court held that under S.18 of the Act, the appellate authority, being a District Judge and the Act being a special law by application of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, all the provisions in Ss.4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply to a proceedings before the Appellate Authority. In that context, in Mukri Gopalan’s case it was held that S.5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to proceedings before the appellate authority under the Act. However, no pronouncement was made therein regarding the power of the Rent Control Court to apply S.5 of the Limitation Act to proceedings before it.

4. In Ratheesh’s case, this Court taking note of the ratio in M.P. Steel Corporation’s case and Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department (2008) 7 SCC 169), entered a finding that the Rent Control Court is powerless to apply S.5 of the Limitation Act to extend the prescribed time.

5. Learned counsel seriously challenged this finding on the following grounds : Firstly, it is contended that the Rent Control Court is a court, although it may be having only limited jurisdiction. Still, it is a court and therefore the Limitation Act in its entirety is applicable, of course, subject to S.29(2) of the Limitation Act. Learned counsel placed reliance on Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi AIR 1950 SC 188, a Constitution Bench decision, laying down the test to distinguish between a judicial forum and a quasi-judicial or administrative body. In paragraph 56, the following proposition is laid down:

“56. The other fundamental test which distinguishes a judicial from a quasi-judicial or administrative body is that the former decides controversies according to law, while the latter is not bound strictly to follow the law for its decision. The investigation of facts on evidence adduced by the parties may be a common feature in both judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals, but the difference between the two lies in the fact that in a judicial proceeding the Judge has got to apply t