IMPORTANT POINTS
If a particular activity causes nuisance or pollution, the competent Authority of the Panchayat can interfere appropriately, as per law. This does not, however, mean that such action can be taken without following due procedure and without explaining why it is warranted. The incorporation of a condition in the Trade Licence solely on account of unsubstantiated and unproven allegations cannot obtain the imprimatur of this Court.

JUDGMENT :

1. Within the provisions of the Kerala Panchayath Raj (Issue of Licence to Factories, Trades, Entrepreneurship activities and other services) Rules ((herein after referred to as 'FTEOS Rules' for short) (earlier called Kerala Panchayath Raj (Issue of Licence to Dangerous and Offensive Trades and Factories) Rules), resides a particular Rule which enables the village Panchayath to specify the working time of a factory, workshop or a workplace, in which steam power, water power or other mechanical power or electricity is used and the operational contours of this provision has been called into question in this Writ Petition.

2. Even though the afore provisions have not been assailed in this Writ Petition, the petitioner has approached this Court impugning a condition imposed against it, asserting that the procedural mandate of the said provisions had not been followed while doing so and therefore, that it be set aside.

3. The petitioner, which is stated to be a registered Firm, engaged in 'Events Management', has approached this Court impugning a condition imposed in Ext.P3 Trade Licence issued to them by the respondent-Maneed Grama Panchayath, as per which, they have been asked to confine the working time of their godown to 6 p.m. everyday. They say that this restriction in Ext.P3 is illogical, unnecessary and legally untenable; and consequentially prays that it be set aside.

4. The petitioner has also impelled an alternative argument that they do not require a Trade Licence to operate the godown under the provisions of the FTEOS Rules, there being no sale or trade activity carried on therein; and that they are only required to intimate the Local Authority that the building is being used as a godown and thus that the impugned restriction is incompetent.

5. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-Maneed Grama Panchayath submits that a counter affidavit has been filed on record, wherein it has been stated that the petitioner's building is offending the applicable Building Rules and that the impugned condition has been imposed in Ext.P3 Licence only on account of objections from the neighbouring property owners. He says that, as is evidenced from Ext.R1(a) and R1(e), certain persons residing near the petitioner's godown had complained that on account of the continuous activity therein, including welding, cutting of iron sheets etc. and the movement of large lorries, entering and leaving the godown, causes severe noise pollution. He thus asserts that the building in question is being used by the petitioner not merely as a godown and that various other activities are also being carried on therein and therefore, that they can operate it only under a valid licence.

6. The learned Standing Counsel adds that, subsequently, at the instance of a few Councillors of the Panchayath, the petitioner and the neighbouring property owners entered into Ext.R1(j) agreement, whereby they expressly agreed that they will only operate their godwon only until 6 p.m. each day. The learned Standing Counsel, therefore, prays that Ext.P3 be left uninterdicted.

7. In response, Sri.Nikhil Sankar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that a learned Division Bench of this Court has already considered the question whether the Trade Licence issued to a business can be incorporated with restrictive conditions merely on account of objections from other persons and that it has been declared unequivocally that such restrictions are illegal and unlawful. He cites Anilkumar M.K. and Others v. Aiswarya Rice Mill and Others [2015(5) KHC 891] in substantiation of this; and then adds that Ext.R1(j) was, in fact, procured from his client by duress and force by certain elements with vested interests in the presence of two Councillors of the Panchayath. He thus asserts that Ext.R1(j) could not have been relied upon by the Panchayath to impose the impugned condition in Ext.P3, since it is illegal and therefore, unconstitutional.

8. When I consider the afore sub