IMPORTANT POINTS
When one goes through the provisions under Section 42, which only provides that when an application is made to a court with respect to an arbitration agreement, it alone will have the jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and that all subsequent applications arising out of the agreement and that the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that court and in no other.

JUDGMENT :

An attempt has been made through this appeal to assail an order of the Arbitrator, concededly issued from the Seat of Arbitration in Chennai-ordering certain interim measures under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996-before this Court on the allegation that said order is now being enforced through the District Court, Alappuzha, within whose limits the subject matter is presently situated.

2. The interpretational question impelled before this Court is whether, merely because an order of the Arbitrator is sought to be enforced in Kerala, under the provisions of Section 17(2), said order would become susceptible to a challenge before this Court, construing it to be competent, as per the definition of “Court” under Section 2(e) of the afore mentioned Act.

3. Before I proceed to answer this, the constitutive facts would be required to be seen.

4. This appeal has been filed by the appellant impugning the order issued by the Arbitrator in an arbitration proceedings initiated against him by M/s. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. ('the Bank' for short), the respondent herein, under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' for short), as amended through the Act, 2015.

5. The appellant says that the impugned order issued by the Arbitrator, as per which, his movable properties have been ordered to be taken possession of by a Receiver, is illegal and unlawful; and therefore, that he is entitled to challenge the same before this Court. However, in the same breath, the appellant concedes that the seat of arbitration is in Chennai and that, as per the terms of the arbitration agreement, only the courts in Chennai will obtain jurisdiction. He, nevertheless, contends that since the Bank has approached the District Court, Alappuzha, for enforcement of the impugned order, by filing C.M.A.(Arb.) No. 24/2019, this Court will obtain jurisdiction under Section 42 of the Act. He thus prays that this appeal be allowed.

6. I heard Smt. C.G. Bindu, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri. Latheesh Sebastian, learned counsel appearing for the bank.

7. Smt. C.G. Bindu made vehement submissions that, going by the provisions of Section 42 of the Act, this Court will obtain jurisdiction to entertain this appeal because the Bank had themselves approached the District Court, Alappuzha for enforcement of the order impugned herein. She says that the 'Court' in Section 42, read with Section 36 of the Act, is the one which obtains jurisdiction to enforce orders issued under the Act; and therefore, that when the Bank themselves have invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court, Alappuzha, this appeal becomes maintainable before this Court. She thus reiteratingly prays that this appeal be entertained and allowed.

8. Sri. Latheesh Sebastian, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank, in opposition submits that the afore assertions of Smt. C.G. Bindu are wholly untenable because, going by Section 2(e) of the Act, a Court has been defined in the following manner:

“2(e) “Court” means -

(i) in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;

(ii) in the case of international commercial arbitration, the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, and in other cases, a High Court having jurisdiction to hear appeals from decrees of Courts subordinate to that High Court.”

He says that by