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2020 Supreme(Ker) 216

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
C.K.ABDUL REHIM, SHIRCY V., JJ.
M/s. Lots Shipping Company Limited – Petitioner
Versus
Cochin Port Trust Board Of Trustees, Willingdon Island – Respondent
OP (C).No.586 OF 2018(O)
Decided On : 28-04-2020

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Sri. Anil S.Raj, Smt. Anila Peter, Smt. K.N.Rajani, Sri. Radhika, Rajasekharan P., Sri. S.Sudheesh, Sri. Sajen Thampan, Advs.
For the Respondent: Sri. K.Anand (Sr.), Advs., Smt. Latha Anand, SC, Sri. P.B. Krishnan (Amicus Curiae)

IMPORTANT POINTS
In a case where appointment of an arbitrator is made under Section 11(6) of the Act by the High Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, it would be incongruous for the principal civil court of original jurisdiction to substitute such an arbitrator or to refuse extension of the time limit as provided under Section 29A, or to make a reduction in the fees of the Arbitrator. Therefore a purposive interpretation becomes more inevitable.

Headnote:

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 29A ;; The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015--Term “court” used in Section 29(4) has to be given an contextual and purposive interpretation, which is to be in variance with the meaning conferred to the said term under subsection Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act. The term “court” contained in Section 29(4) has to be interpreted as the 'Supreme Court' in the case of international commercial arbitrations and as the 'High Court' in the case of domestic arbitrations. Hence it is held that, either of the party will be at liberty to file an arbitration petition before the High Court under Section 29A(5) of the Act, seeking extension of time for continuance of the arbitration proceedings in exercise of the power conferred under Section 29A(4) of the Act, in the case of any domestic arbitration.

Statement of facts:

The issue with respect to interpretation of the word “court” contained in sub-section (4) of Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as it stood amended by virtue of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, which came into force on 23.10.2015.

Finding of the court:

Term “court” used in Section 29(4) has to be given an contextual and purposive interpretation, which is to be in variance with the meaning conferred to the said term under subsection Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act. The term “court” contained in Section 29(4) has to be interpreted as the 'Supreme Court' in the case of international commercial arbitrations and as the 'High Court' in the case of domestic arbitrations. Hence it is held that, either of the party will be at liberty to file an arbitration petition before the High Court under Section 29A(5) of the Act, seeking extension of time for continuance of the arbitration proceedings in exercise of the power conferred under Section 29A(4) of the Act, in the case of any domestic arbitration.

Result: Original petition Allowed

JUDGMENT :

Abdul Rehim, J.

A learned Judge of this court has referred the above case on the opinion that it requires an authoritative pronouncement by a Division Bench, on the issue with respect to interpretation of the word “court” contained in sub-section (4) of Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ('the Act', for short), as it stood amended by virtue of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, which came into force on 23.10.2015.

2. Section 29A of the Act deals with the 'time-limit for arbitral award'. The provisions of Section 29-A is extracted hereunder for an easy reference;

    “29A. Time limit for arbitral award.—(1) The award shall be made within a period of twelve months from the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference.

Explanation.— For the purpose of this sub-section, an arbitral Tribunal shall be deemed to have entered upon the reference on the date on which the arbitrator or all the arbitrators, as the case may be, have received notice, in writing, of their appointment.

(2) If the award is made within a period of six months from the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference, the arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to receive such amount of additional fees as the parties may agree.

(3) The parties may, by consent, extend the period specified in sub-section (1) for making award for a further period not exceeding six months.

(4) If the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section (1) or the extended period specified under sub-section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period.

Provided that while extending the period under this sub-section, if the Court finds that the proceedings have been delayed for the reasons attributable to the arbitral tribunal, then, it may order reduction of fees of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five per cent for each month of such delay.

(5) The extension of period referred to in sub-section (4) may be on the application of any of the parties and may be granted only for sufficient cause and on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Court.

(6) While extending the period referred to in subsection (4), it shall be open to the Court to substitute one or all of the arbitrators and if one or all of the arbitrators are substituted, the arbitral proceedings shall continue from the stage already reached and on the basis of the evidence and material already on record, and the arbitrator(s) appointed under this section shall be deemed to have received the said evidence and material.

(7) In the event of arbitrator(s) being appointed under this section, the arbitral tribunal thus reconstituted shall be deemed to be in continuation of the previously appointed arbitral Tribunal.

(8) It shall be open to the Court to impose actual or exemplary costs upon any of the parties under this section.1

(9) An application filed under sub-section (5) shall be disposed of by the Court as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to dispose of the matter within a period of sixty days from the date of service of notice on the opposite party.”

3. Sub-section (4) of Section 29 provides that if the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section (1) or the extended period specified under sub-section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator shall terminate unless the court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period. Sub-section (5) stipulates that the extension of the period referred to in sub-section (4) may be on the application of any of the parties and may be granted only for sufficient cause and on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the court.

4. While considering the question as to which is the “court” specified under Sub-Section (4) of Section 29A, a learned Judge of this court in the decision in M/s URC Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s BEML Ltd., Palakkad(2017

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