Point of Law: Duty of the officers and chief executive of a society and the nature of offences and penalties mentioned in [sub-section (4A)] shall be applicable to this sub-section also.

JUDGMENT :

P.B.Suresh Kumar, J.

This writ appeal is directed against the judgment dated 2.12.2020 in W.P.(C) No.20210 of 2020. The appellant is the petitioner in the writ petition.

2. The appellant is a Primary Agricultural Credit Society (the Society), a co-operative society registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (the Act). The last election to the managing committee of the Society took place on 06.05.2018 and the managing committee elected on 10.05.2018 is therefore entitled to continue in office till 09.05.2023. During 2020, on the basis of a complaint lodged by the fourth respondent and a few others, the first respondent, the jurisdictional Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, directed the second respondent to inspect the books of the Society under Section 66(2) of the Act. Later, on the basis of the report of the said inspection, the Joint Registrar issued Ext.P4 notice calling upon the managing committee of the Society to show cause why they shall not be superseded under Section 32(1)(c) of the Act. Ext.P4 notice was challenged by the appellant in the writ petition mainly on the ground that the power under Section 32(1) of the Act cannot be invoked on the basis of a report of inspection under Section 66(2). The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition in limine, placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Krishnan Nair v. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 2014 (1) KLT 116. The appellant is aggrieved by the said decision of the learned Single Judge. Hence, this appeal.

3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant as also the learned Government Pleader.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that a proceedings under Section 32 of the Act can be invoked only based on an inquiry conducted under Section 65 or on a report of the financing bank or the Vigilance and Anti-corruption Bureau of the Government or the Vigilance Officer and a proceedings under that provision cannot be invoked based on the report of an inspection conducted under Section 66(2) of the Act. It was conceded by the learned counsel that sub-section (1) of Section 32 empowers the Registrar to initiate proceedings under that provision otherwise as well, but, according to the learned counsel, the word 'otherwise' used in sub-section (1) of Section 32 can only be understood ejusdem generis, that is to say, similar to the group made mention of in sub-section (1) of Section 32. The learned counsel pointed out that a report of inspection conducted under Section 66(2) of the Act cannot be equated to a report of an inquiry under Section 65 or the reports of the financing bank or Vigilance and Anti-corruption Bureau of the Government or Vigilance Officer made mention of in subsection (1) of Section 32. The learned counsel elaborated the said submission pointing out that the reports of the authorities made mention of in sub-section (1) of Section 32 are reports from which the competent authority would be able to satisfy the existence of any one or more of the jurisdictional grounds referred to in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 32, for the purpose of invoking the power conferred thereunder. It was argued by the learned counsel that Section 66(2) of the Act, on the other hand, confers only a limited power on the Registrar to inspect the books of the society on an application made by a creditor of the society and the purpose of inspection provided for under Section 66(2) is only to ascertain whether any debt is due to the creditor from the society and also whether the society has satisfied the demand of the creditor for payment of the debt within a reasonable time. According to the learned counsel, insofar as the purpose of inspection under Section 66(2) has nothing to do with any of the jurisdictional grounds made mention of in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 32, there cannot be any subjective satisfaction as to the existence or otherwise of any of the jurisdictional grounds ba