Point of Law: Since the statutory scheme provides that the reference under Section 28A(3) will be governed, and guided by the provisions of Sections 18 and 28A(1), but does not specify a particular time limit for the petitioner to make a reference thereunder, it is clear that there are two types of periods of limitations provided in the afore two Sections.

JUDGMENT :

The interpretational interplay of sub-sections 1 and 3 of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (hereinafter referred to as the “LA Act” for short), has been invited to my attention in this case because the petitioner says that even if his application under section 28A(1) of the said Act is rejected, he obtains a right to make further application for reference to the competent Reference Court under Section 28A(3) thereof.

2. The petitioner is stated to be the owner of a property which has been acquired by the Government for the purpose of establishment of an “IT Park” and concedes that an Award was also issued in his favour. He says that, however, certain other land owners of the properties covered by the same acquisition notification, took up their Awards before the Sub-Court, Kozhikkod, in LAR 90/2013 and connected matters, which culminated in Ext.P4 order dated 21/10/2014, enhancing the compensation. He says that he, thereupon, preferred an application under Section 28A(1) of the “LA Act” on 20/10/2015, which is within the statutory time limit, but that no action was taken by the competent Authority on it for the next five years.

3. The petitioners says that, in the meanwhile, Ext.P5 order was challenged before this Court, which ended in Ext.P3 judgment in LAA No.20/2015 and connected matters, delivered on 28/05/2018. He says that he came to be aware of this judgment only later and that immediately thereafter, on 27/11/2019, he applied for a certified copy of the same, which was delivered to him sometime on 05/12/2019 and that within two months hence, he preferred a fresh application under Section 28A(1) of the “LA Act” before the competent Authority on 29/01/2020. The petitioner says that it transpires the competent Authority, vide Ext.P5 order dated 18/01/2020, disposed of his first application dated 21/10/2014 and then pertinently issued Ext.P6 order on 07/05/2021, deciding his second application dated 29/01/2020.

4. The petitioner contends that both Exts.P5 and P6 are untenable because the land in question differs from the land covered by Ext.P3 judgment; while, his second application dated 29/01/2020, has been rejected merely saying that it has been filed beyond time.

5. The petitioner, therefore, prays that both Exts.P5 and P6 be set aside and that the competent Authority be directed to reconsider his application dated 29/01/2020 on its merits.

6. As an alternative and adscitious submission, the petitioner contends that, even assuming Exts.P5 and P6 can be found to be tenable, he has a further remedy under Section 28A(3) of the LA Act, whereby he can seek that the Award be referred to the competent Reference Court; and, thus prays that such liberty be reserved to him, since the above mentioned provision does not provide for any specific time limit for making such an application.

7. I have heard Sri.Nidheesh.T.P. - learned counsel appearing for the petitioner; Sri.Abdul Salam - learned 4th counsel appearing for the respondent; and Smt.Sudhadevi - learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the official respondents.

8. Smt.Sudhadevi, in answer to the afore submissions of Sri.Nidheesh T.P., submitted that the petitioner cannot challenge Exts.P5 and P6 because they have been issued after considering all relevant aspects; and that, in fact, the former clearly states the reasons why his request under Section 28A(1) of the “LA Act” cannot be acceded to. She pointed out that, as is specifically stated therein, the nature of the property of the petitioner is completely different from that of the one covered by Exts.P3 and P4 judgments; and consequently, that it was impossible to have made reference under Section 28A(3) of the “LA Act”, even though he had preferred objections to the same. She added that the petitioner has not done so until today and that is not possible for him to do so in future, because there is the rigour of limitation under Section 28A(1) of the “LA Act”. She, therefore, prayed that this wr