JUDGMENT :

1. The present Writ Petition (Civil) under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed impugning Exhibits P-1 and P-2 summons for appearance of the petitioner for arrest for violation of Section 69 (1) of the CGST Act, 2017.

2. Mr. Joseph Kodianthara (Sr.), Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that without compliying the mandatory provisions of Section 41A of the Cr.P.C., petitioner is sought to be arrested for an alleged offence as defined under of Section 69 (1) of the CGST Act, 2017. In support to his submission, Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the Supreme Court Judgment in State of Gujarat etc. v. Choodamani Prameshwaran Iyer and Another (2023 SCC Online SC 1043).

3. On the other hand, Ms. Rashmita Ramachandran, Learned Government Pleader has opposed the writ petition and submitted that the petitioner has been issued notice for appearance and despite the notice, the petitioner has not appeared to record his statement. The petitioner is an absconder. She further submits that in fact, in this case, though there is no requirement of compliance of the provisions of Section 41A of the Cr. P.C., but the same should be deemed to have been complied by issuing summons vide Exhibits P-1 and P-2.

4. I have considered the submissions and gone through the Judgment in State of Gujarat etc. (supra) cited by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner. In the said Judgment reliance has been placed on an earlier Judgment passed by the High Court for the State of Telangana in P. P. Ramana Reddy v. Union of India (W.P.(C) No.4764 of 2019 and allied petitions decided on 18.04.2019). In P. P. Ramana Reddy (supra), in paragraphs 41 to 43 while interpreting the provisions of Section 69(1) of CGST Act, 2017 in juxtaposition of the provisions of Section 41 and 41A it has been held as under;

“41. Though for the purpose of summoning of witnesses and for summoning the production of documents, the Proper Officer holding the enquiry under the CGST Act, 2017 is treated like a Civil Court, there are four other places in the Act, where a reference is made, directly or indirectly, to the Cr.P.C. They are (1) the reference to Cr.P.C. in relation to search and seizure under Section 67(10) of CGST Act, 2017, (2) the reference to Cr.P.C. under sub-Section (3) of Section 69 in relation to the grant of bail for a person arrested in connection to a non-cognizable and bailable offence, (3) the reference to Cr.P.C. in Section 132 (4) while making all offences under the CGST Act, 2017 except those specified in clauses (a) to (d) of Section 132 (1) of CGST Act, 2017 as non-cognizable and bailable and (4) the reference to Sections 193 and 228 of IPC in Section 70(2) of the CGST Act, 2017. Therefore, the contention of learned Additional Solicitor General that in view of Section 69(3) of the CGST Act, 2017, the petitioners cannot fall back upon the limited protection against arrest, found in Sections 41 and 41A of Cr.P.C., may not be correct. As pointed out earlier, Section 41-A was inserted in Cr.P.C. by Section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008. Under sub-Section (3) of Section 41A Cr.P.C., a person who complies with a notice for appearance and who continues to comply with the notice for appearance before the Summoning Officer, shall not be arrested. In fact, the duty imposed upon a Police Officer under Section 41A(1) Cr.P.C., to summon a person for enquiry in relation to a cognizable offence, is what is substantially ingrained in Section 70(1) of the CGST Act. Though Section 69(1) which confers powers upon the Commissioner to order the arrest of a person does not contain the safeguards that are incorporated in Section 41 and 41A of Cr.P.C., we think Section 70(1) of the CGST Act takes care of the contingency.

42. In any case, the moment the Commissioner has reasons to believe that a person has committed a cognizable and non-bailable offence warranting his arrest, then we think that the safeguards before ar