JUDGMENT :- This appeal is filed against the order dated 15-12-1973 passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Quepem, dismissing an application made by the appellants/plaintiffs under O. 9, Civil P. C. for setting aside an order of dismissal of the suit for default.

2. The hearing of the suit was fixed for 5th April 1973. The date was fixed for hearing the evidence of the plaintiffs. On the previous day of hearing the plaintiffs and their advocate Shri Laximona Naik were present in Court. On 5-4-1973 neither the plaintiffs nor their advocate was present and the suit was dismissed for default. The advocate Shri Naik made an application under O. 9. R. 9. Civil P. C. which was dismissed by the impugned order. The application was made by Shri Naik on his own behalf. All the grounds given in the application are grounds which relate to the inability of Shri Naik to appear in Court. No mention whatsoever is made of the inability of the plaintiffs to appear in Court. Before me also it is not contended that the plaintiffs were for any good reason, unable to attend the Court on 5-4-1973 for giving evidence. The application is supported by an affidavit of Shri Naik. No affidavit of the plaintiffs is placed on record. A medical certificate to the effect that Shri Naik was indisposed and unable to attend the Court was also placed on record. In view of these facts it was contended by Shri Reis before the lower Court and before me that the application as framed is not maintainable because an application under O. 9, R. 9 has to be made by the plaintiffs themselves or by their advocate on their behalf. The present application was not made by Shri Naik on behalf of the plaintiffs but was made on behalf of himself. I entirely agree with this contention of Shri Reis. Upon the dismissal of the suit for default the wakalatnama given by the plaintiffs to Shri Naik ceased to have any effect and Shri Naik would have no locus standi whatsoever in any subsequent proceedings. Apart from the fact that he did not make the application in question on behalf of the plaintiffs, there is the fact that even if he wanted to make it in the name of the plaintiffs he would not be entitled to do so. I am fortified in this view by the decision given by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in The Hyderabad Import Export Co., Secunderabad v. The United Trading Co., Bhagathikot, Jodhpur, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 652. I am in agreement with the learned trial Judge that for this reason alone the application has necessarily to be dismissed. No serious challenge could be made by Shri Shinkre to this preliminary point raised by Shri Reis and accepted by the lower Court.

3. It is contended by Shri Shinkre that Shri Naik made on the same day. before the lower Court, another application for adjournment on the ground of illness; that that application was granted; and that that fact should be taken into consideration by the trial Court and the application for setting aside the dismissal for default should be granted. I am unable to agree with Shri Shinkre. There is nothing on record to show that in the other case in which the application for adjournment was made the presence of the plaintiffs was necessary for the purpose of giving evidence and that merely the presence of the advocate was not enough. It is also not known whether the application for adjournment was granted by the consent of the opposite side. It is quite possible that in the other case the presence of the plaintiffs was not at all necessary and that the hearing of the case had been fixed either for arguments or for cross-examination or for framing issues or for discussing some preliminary objection or for deciding some other application.

4. The presence of Shri Naik was not necessary for making an application for adjournment on the ground of ill health. Such an application could be sent by anyone and presented to Court. In the absence of any reason given as to why Shri Naik chose not to make any application for adjournment before the lower

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