1976 Supreme(Goa) 18
Goa High Court
TITO MENEZES, J.C.
A Devalaia de Shri Deus Sideswor and its affiliate Temples of Surla - Appellant
Versus
Bablo Dadu Gadi - Respondents
Civil Revn. Appln. No. 76 of 1975
Decided On : 28 April 1976
P. Mulgaonkar, for Applicant; M.S. Usgaonkar, for Respondents Nos. 1 to 10.
A mistake of law is not a ground for condonation of delay in filing a revision application unless it falls within the ambit of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Headnote:
LIMITATION ACT, 1963 - SECTION 14(2) - REVISION APPLICATION - EXCLUSION OF TIME - APPLICABILITY - CONDITIONS - MISTAKE OF LAW - CONDONATION OF DELAY - APPLICABILITY.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner filed a revision application challenging the order of the trial court restoring possession of the suit land to the respondents. The application was filed one month and seven days after the limitation period expired. The petitioner argued that the time spent in pursuing a previous revision application challenging different orders of the trial court should be excluded under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, as it was filed in good faith and against the same respondents.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the previous revision application did not seek the same relief as the present one, as it challenged different orders of the trial court. Therefore, Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act was not attracted, and the petitioner was not entitled to the exclusion of time.
Issues: 1. Whether the time spent in pursuing a previous revision application challenging different orders of the trial court can be excluded under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. 2. Whether a mistake of law can be a ground for condonation of delay in filing a revision application.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act allows for the exclusion of time spent in pursuing a proceeding that the court is unable to entertain due to lack of jurisdiction or other similar reasons. 2. In the present case, the previous revision application did not challenge the same orders as the present one, and therefore, the court was not unable to entertain it. Thus, Section 14(2) was not applicable. 3. A mistake of law is not a ground for condonation of delay unless it falls within the ambit of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the revision application as barred by limitation.
ORDER :- This is an application for the revision of the order dated March 18th, 1975 of the Senior Civil Judge, Bicholim whereby the learned Senior Civil Judge restored the possession of the suit land to the defendants.
2. The petitioner filed proceedings under Article 400 of Portuguese Civil Procedure Code in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Bicholim against the respondents for obtaining provisional restitution of possession of the suit land of which, according to the applicants they have been forcibly dispossessed by the defendants. The provisional restitution of possession of the suit land was granted. Thereafter as per the requirements of law the petitioner filed a regular suit for possession under Article 1032 of the Portuguese Civil Procedure Code. By the judgement dated February 12th, 1975 of the Senior Civil Judge, Bicholim the suit was dismissed and the defendants were declared to be the owners in possession of the suit land for over 30 years. Aggrieved by the judgement and order of the trial Court dated February 12, 1975 the petitioner preferred an appeal to this Court which, according to the Portuguese Civil Procedure Code was filed in the trial Court. Whilst filing the appeal the applicant prayed that the appeal be admitted with suspensive effect, pending the hearing and disposal of the appeal. The trial Court, however, by its order dated February 26th, 1975 admitted the appeal as Apelacao having merely devolutive effect, i. e., without suspensive effect. The applicant came in revision before this Court against the order of March 18th, 1975. As the trial Court admitted the appeal merely with devolutive effect the respondents made an application to the trial Court and prayed that the temporary restoration of possession given to the applicant be vacated and the possession of the suit land be given to the respondents. This application of the respondents was granted by the trial Court by its order dated March 18th, 1975 which is now the subject-matter of this revision application.
3. The respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding limitation. Admittedly the revision application was filed one month and seven days after the limitation period was over. It is contended by Shri Mulgaonkar learned advocate for the applicant that the applicant was entitled under Section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, to the exclusion of time during which he pursued in this Court the previous revision application challenging the orders of the trial Court dated February 26th, 1975 and March 18th, 1975. Shri Mulgaonkar argues that the previous application was filed in good faith by the present applicant against the present respondents for the same relief. The application appears to have been filed in good faith and there can be no dispute that the parties are the same. But the question however, arises as to whether the relief prayed for in tine previous application is the same as in the one prayed for in the present application. There the applicant challenged two entirely different orders. Shri Mulgaonkar states that though the order of the 26th February, 1975 was different from the order of the 18th March, 1975, which is impugned in this revision application, both the orders had the same object. I am unable to agree with Shri Mulgaonkar. By the order dated February 26th, 1975 an appeal was admitted with devolutive effect whereas by the order of March 18th, 1975 the possession of the suit land was restored to the respondents. By the order of February 26, 1975 the trial Court declined to stay the execution of the order appealed against whereas by the order of March 18th, 1975 the trial Court went one step further and restored the suit land which had been given in possession of the applicant, to the possession of the respondents. It cannot, therefore, be said that the two civil revision applications were filed for obtaining the same relief. Under S. 14 (2) of the Limitation Act the Court must be unable to entertain a certa