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1976 Supreme(Goa) 15
Goa High Court
TITO MENEZES, J.C.
Paixao Fernandes and another - Appellant
Versus
Amelia de Souza and another - Respondents
Civil Revn. Appln. No. 116 of 1975
Decided On : 30 March 1976
Ataide Lobo, for Applicants; V.M.S. Neurencar, for Respondents.
Undervaluation of a suit does not automatically lead to prejudicial effect on merits; prejudice must be directly attributable to over-valuation or under-valuation and result in injustice.
Headnote:
SUITS VALUATION ACT, 1887 - SECTION 7(1)(B) - UNDERVALUATION OF SUIT - PREJUDICIAL EFFECT ON MERITS - INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of possession of a dwelling house and mesne profits. The suit was valued at Rs. 3,125/-. The defendants challenged the valuation, claiming the suit land was worth Rs. 50,000/-. The trial court held that the suit was properly valued and decreed it in full. On appeal, the District Judge held that the suit was undervalued and remanded the case for trial.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the suit was undervalued but that the undervaluation did not prejudicially affect the disposal of the suit on merits. The court relied on several precedents holding that the mere fact that an appeal had to be brought in a lower court instead of a higher court does not constitute prejudice on merits.
Issues: 1. Whether the suit was undervalued? 2. Whether the disposal of the suit was prejudicially affected on merits due to undervaluation?
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the suit was undervalued based on the evidence presented by the defendants, including the testimony of witnesses who estimated the value of the suit land to be significantly higher than the valuation claimed by the plaintiff. However, the court found that the undervaluation did not prejudicially affect the disposal of the suit on merits. The court reasoned that the mere fact that the appeal had to be brought in the District Court instead of the Judicial Commissioner's Court did not constitute prejudice on merits, as there was a fair and full hearing of the parties and the trial court gave its decision on merits on consideration of the entire evidence in the case.
Final Decision: The High Court set aside the order of the District Court and remanded the case for being disposed of according to law.
ORDER :- This proceeding was initially filed as Miscellaneous Civil Appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(4) of the C. P. C. and was later on, on the application of the applicant, treated as a Civil Revision Application. A Preliminary objection is raised by Shri Neurencar that the Civil Revision Application is barred by limitation. According to him this proceeding is deemed to have been filed on the day on which it was treated as an appeal over three months after the passing of the order which is impugned in this Civil Revision Application. Shri Neurencar relies on Anandrao Baliram v. Parvatibai, AIR 1941 Nag 308. In that case the proceeding was originally filed as an Appeal. It was within time as an Appeal. Grille J. decided that the matter should be dealt with as a Revision and it appears that accordingly the proceeding was treated as a Revision Application. It also appears from the decision that an objection was raised, like the one raised in the present case, on the ground that the Revision Application was barred by limitation. The report of the judgement of the Nagpur High Court in Anandrao Balirams case delivered by Vivian Bose, J., does not state that his Lordship specifically held that the period of limitation should be counted not till the date on which the Appeal was filed but till the date on which the Appeal was treated as a Revision Application. The learned Judge then proceeded to decide whether the delay should be condoned. He held that the reasons assigned for the delay being the doubt which the conflicting decisions have raised as to whether an appeal or a Revision Application lay, the reason should be accepted as sufficient cause for the condonation of the delay. Apart from the fact that no clear finding is given regarding the counting of the period of limitation, the ratio decidendi for holding that the period of limitation should be counted upto the date on which the original proceedings was treated as a Revision Application and not unto the date on which the initial proceeding was filed as an Appeal, is not given in the judgement as reported in AIR 1941 Nag 308. Indeed it is not clear from AIR 1941 Nag 308 what was the fact that necessitated condonation of delay. In any event, I would, with great respect to the learned Judge, differ from his opinion if at all it could be said that he has in that decision in clear terms laid down that the period of limitation should be counted unto the date on which the Appeal was treated as a Revision Application and not upto the date on which the Appeal was filed. It seems to me that the case is one of a mere treatment to be given to a memo of Appeal and not a case of conversion in substance of one proceeding into another. What is relevant for our purpose is to find out whether the memo which was originally filed as one of Appeal contains the material which a Revision Application must contain. If a certain proceeding holds good as a Revision proceeding but was filed as an appeal, the treating of the Appeal as a Revision Application would only affect the form and not the substance. The period of limitation is qua a certain proceeding. The title of the proceeding is of no relevance if it could be shown that in substance the proceeding could be considered as a proceeding different from the designation it bears. If an Appeal is treated as a Revision Application, the treatment relates back to the date on which the appeal is filed. This principle would not, however, apply to cases in which one proceeding is substantially converted into another by amendment or otherwise. In such cases the question will not be merely of a change of form but of substance; there would be a conversion made and not merely a treatment given. A proceeding which is converted into another must be deemed to be a new proceeding filed on the day on which the conversion takes place. I therefore hold that for the purpose of limitation this proceeding in revision shall be deemed to have been filed on the date
