The central legal point established in the judgment is that the case did not involve an interpretation of the Constitution or the Rent Control Act, and there was no necessity for a decision by the Supreme Court on the questions raised.

ORDER :- This is an application under Articles 132 (1) and 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution of India for a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court.

2. The facts are very simple and the judgement deals with questions of facts only. The applicant was a tenant in respect of a house. The respondent had sought his eviction on two grounds viz. default in payment of rent and use of the premises for a purpose different from the one for which the same was leased.

3. The trial Court had dismissed the suit but an appeal to this Court reversed the decree and allowed the claim.

4. The certificate under Art. 132 is sought on the ground that there is discrimination in respect of the application of the Goa, Daman and Diu Rent Control Act because it has been extended to the town of Ponda and a few surrounding villages but not to this village of Borim and this infringes Article 14 of the Constitution. This argument has to be rejected because at no stage there was any reference to the interpretation of the Constitution about the validity of the Rent Control Act. Besides, even if the Rent Control Act is deemed to be unconstitutional, no relief can be available to the applicant as his case was not decided under the Rent Control Act but under Decree No. 43525. Thus there is no question which involves an interpretation of the Constitution. Further in view of the Presidents Proclamation

rights under Article. 14 are suspended and therefore, any certificate would be infructuous.

5. With regard to the fitness of the case for appeal under Article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution, the learned Advocate canvassed two grounds. First was that the applicant-tenant had made the deposit of arrears of rent after obtaining the order of the Court. Though he had applied for such an order earlier, no order was passed and he should not be punished for the act of the Court. On the question of default this Court had held that there was non-compliance with Articles 41 and 47 of the Decree No. 43525 inasmuch as the rent and compensation were not deposited before filing the written statement. This question of fact that the rent was not paid before filing of the written statement was admitted. Whether the rent paid subsequently after obtaining the Courts order could be treated as due compliance or not is not a substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.

6. The second point made by the applicant was that the question of estoppel was wrongly decided by this Court. This argument also does not answer the imperative requirement under Article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution. Such requirements have been discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money, Civil Appeals Nos. 933 and 934 of 1975 decided on 16-1-1976 = (reported in AIR 1976 SC 1111). It was observed as follows :-

"Nay, more; the question, however important and substantial, must be of such pervasive import and deep significance that in the High Courts judgement it imperatively needs to be settled at the national level by the highest bench."

Their Lordships approved the observation of the Delhi High Court in Union of India v. Hafiz Moh. Said, ILR (1973) 2 Delhi 673 = (AIR 1975 Delhi 77) (FB). The observations are as follows:-

"Further the word needs suggests that there has to be necessity for a decision by the Supreme Court on the question, and such a necessity can be said to exist, when, for instance, two views are possible regarding the question and the High Court takes one of the said views. Such a necessity can be expressed by another High Court."

7. These being the postulates under Article 133(1) (c) of the Constitution, the present application cannot be allowed and the same is dismissed with costs Rs. 50/-.

Application dismissed.