1978 Supreme(Goa) 2
Goa High Court
TITO MENEZES, J.C.
Pandurang B.P. Malkarnekar - Appellant
Versus
Government of Goa, Daman and Diu - Respondents
First Civil Appeals Nos. 42 to 46 of 1977
Decided On : 20 January 1978
Inadvertence of the counsel to the relevant provisions of law of limitation is not a sufficient cause for delay condonation.
Headnote:
Delay Condonation - Arbitration Awards - The court held that inadvertence of the counsel to the relevant provisions of law of limitation is not a sufficient cause within the meaning of S. 5 of the Limitation Act, and therefore, the appeals were rejected as barred by limitation.
Fact of the Case:
The appellants filed appeals against arbitration awards, delayed by 59 days, and sought condonation of the delay due to the advocate's inadvertent mistake in looking up the wrong provisions of law governing limitation.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the reason for the delay was the advocate's inadvertent mistake in looking up the wrong provisions of law governing limitation, and held that there was no sufficient cause for condoning the delay, thus rejecting the appeals as barred by limitation.
Issues: Delay condonation, inadvertence of counsel, sufficient cause for delay
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that inadvertence of the counsel to the relevant provisions of law of limitation is not a sufficient cause within the meaning of S. 5 of the Limitation Act.
Final Decision: The appeals were rejected as barred by limitation.
2. From the office report it is seen that the appeals were filed on 15-4-1977 and that they are delayed by 59 days. The application for condonation is supported by an affidavit filed by the advocate for the appellants. It is stated in the application that the advocate for the appellants was wrongly under the impression that the period of limitation for filing the appeal was 90 days: that by inadvertence the advocate for the appellants looked up the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1969 (sic) instead of those of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, and consequently carried that impression. It has also been mentioned in the affidavit that on or about 8-3-1977 the appellants had instructed him to prefer the said appeals. The point that arises is whether the appellants have shown sufficient cause within the meaning of S. 5 of the Limitation Act, to condone the delay.
3. Although the power to condone the delay is discretionary, such discretion has to be used on settled principles and before exercising the discretion it is necessary that the party who applies for condonation satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause as to why the delay was caused. In the present case we find that the reason for the delay is that the learned advocate for the appellant inadvertently looked to some other provisions of law governing limitation hen he was required to look to the provisions of the limitation provided under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952.
4. A similar case came up for decision of the Punjab High Court and it is reported in AIR 1958 Pun 365 (Union of India v. Shree Ram Kanwar). Their Lordships, after holding that no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which in similar circumstances is not shown to an individual suitor, addressed themselves to the question whether delay of the counsel or inadvertence of the counsel to the relevant provision of law of limitation is a sufficient ground for enlarging the period of limitation under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. Their Lordships thereupon have relied on Rajendra Bhadur v. Rajeshwar, AIR 1937 PC 276 and after considering that decision observed :
"It is not possible to enunciate or state all sorts of circumstances in which the mistaken advice by a legal practitioner should be considered a sufficient cause within the meaning of that section, but of one thing I feel quite sure and that is that mere inadvertence of the legal practitioner to a particular provision of the law of limitation directly applicable to the case can in no circumstance be considered sufficient cause within the meaning of that section.
The present case is nothing more than that the learned counsel filing the appeal on behalf of the appellants did not advert to Art. 151 of the Limitation Act before filing the appeal. If it had been the case on behalf of the appellants that on account of conflict of judicial opinion or uncertainty or vagueness about the law, their counsel was in some doubt about the correct position of law, it might have been, I do not say that that would have been acceptable, argued on their behalf, with some show of plausibility, that the appeal was filed beyond time under a mistaken advice of their counsel but no such position has been taken on behalf of the appellants and this in any case is not a case of that type.
It is out-right a cas