The receipt of the suit summons by the defendant amounted to dissolution of the partnership at will. The appointment of a receiver was found to be just and convenient for the protection of partnership assets and to discharge the debts of the firm.

ORDER :- This Civil Revision is directed against an order dated 13-7-1978 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji, in Civil Suit No. 198/76 brought by the respondents for dissolution of partnership, and for rendition of accounts of a hotel business. Pending disposal of the suit, the plaintiffs moved the Court for a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from in any manner conducting the business of the partnership or whatever business in the restaurant premises of the hotel Silpa and also from removing any materials, articles, etc., and also for appointment of a receiver with powers to make inventory of the goods, articles lying in the hotel Silpa, etc.

2. The Court by its order dated 25-9-1976 was pleased to appoint Shri Jairam Dhond as receiver to take into possession all the articles, materials, etc. etc. The receiver executed the order of the Court that very evening. On 5-10-1976, the defendants filed an application to vacate the injunction issued under O.39(A) as well as removal of the receiver appointed under O.40 of C.P.C. On 17th January, 1977, another application was moved (Ext.15) to call upon the receiver to bring back the articles that he had made over to one of the partners and to do certain repair works, etc. Both the petitions having been rejected, the defendants have now come in this Civil Revision.

3. The first point taken is that the partnership being one at will there was no notice earlier to the filing of the suit and as such there is no dissolution of the firm. So no receiver could have been appointed. Section 43 of the Indian Partnership Act which deals with dissolution by notice of partnership at will, reads as under :-

"43(1) Where the partnership is at will, the firm may be dissolved by any partner giving notice in writing to all the other partners of his intention to dissolve the firm.

(2) The firm is absolved as from the date mentioned in the notice as the date of dissolution or, if no date is so mentioned, as from the date of the communication of the notice."

4. The notice required under the aforesaid section must be in writing and must be communicated to all partners. Section 32(c) of the English Partnership Act is pari materia with our present section. In England the view has been taken that if a partnership is at will and a member brings an action for dissolution, without any prior notice, the summons shall be treated as notice to dissolve and the dissolution will date from its service. In Sathappa v. Subrahmanyam, AIR 1927 PC. 70, the Privy Council held that filing of a plaint in a suit for dissolution by one partner and service of the summons is enough to put an end to a partnership at will. Attention of this Court has been drawn to certain observation of the Supreme Court in Banarsi Das v. Kanshi Ram (AIR 1963 SC 1165) which according to the learned counsel for the petitioner indicate a different view. This decision is also relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent. After going through the decision I find that those observations were made in the context of very peculiar and special circumstances and facts of that case and the actual decision was not founded on those observations. In my opinion those observations must be read strictly in the context of the facts of that case and not as laying down a different rule. I am therefore to hold that receipt of the suit summons by the defendant will amount to dissolution of the partnership at will.

5. The next point that arises for consideration is whether the learned trial Court is right in appointing a receiver. Order 40, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code says that the Court should appoint a receiver where it appears to it to be just and convenient. The words "just and convenient" in O.40, R.1 of the Code mean that the Court should appoint a receiver for the protection of property or the prevention of injury to it according to legal principles. The rule does not confer any arbitrary or non-regulated discretion on t