Back
1970 Supreme(Goa) 4
Goa High Court
V. S. JETLEY
Chowgule Real Estate and Construction - Appellant
Versus
Govt. of Goa, Daman and Diu - Respondent
Decided On : 02/10/1970
S.V. Shrinathan, for Petitioner; J. Dias, Govt. Pleader, for Respondents.
The requirements for granting a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under sub-clauses (b) and (c) of Article 133(1) of the Constitution were analyzed and applied to the facts of the case.
Headnote:
DEFENCE OF INDIA ACT, 1962 - SECTION 29(1) - REQUISITIONING AND ACQUISITION OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY ACT, 1952 - CERTIFICATE FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT - SUB-CLAUSES (B) AND (C) OF ARTICLE 133(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION - INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner company sought a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the High Court's judgment rejecting its petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the requisitioning of its quarry under Section 29(1) of the Defence of India Act, 1962.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the requisition order was valid and answered all questions raised by the petitioner company against it.
Issues: 1. Whether sub-clause (b) of Article 133(1) of the Constitution applies to the case, considering the value of the property involved. 2. Whether sub-clause (c) of Article 133(1) applies, considering the importance of the questions of law involved.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Sub-clause (b) of Article 133(1) requires a claim or question respecting property of an amount or value not less than Rs. 20,000, in addition to the subject-matter of the dispute. In this case, there was no such additional property involved. 2. Sub-clause (c) of Article 133(1) allows the High Court to grant a certificate if the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court, considering the importance of the questions dealt with in the judgment. The questions raised in this case, concerning the interpretation of the Defence of India Act, 1962, and the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, were held to be of considerable public or private importance.
Final Decision: The High Court granted the certificate under sub-clause (c) of Article 133(1) of the Constitution, considering the importance of the questions of law involved, and directed that the certificate issue.
"(1) that the impugned order for an indefinite period of time and a refusal to derequisition the same amounts to an arbitrary and colourable exercise of powers especially because the quarry is subject to the law of diminishing return;
(2) that the impugned order is bad as requisite opinion was not formed by the Central Government in terms of Section 29 (1), before its issue;
(3) that the working of the quarry and the extraction of metals does not bear on the subject of securing the Defence of India purpose as stated in the impugned order;
(4) that there is no written order passed by the Central Government delegating its power to requisition the plot in favour of the State Government;
(5) that the Administrator having been appointed by the President of India to administer the Union Territory cannot be delegated the executive function of the Union Government and, for this reason, even if there was an order of the Central Government delegating its powers to requisition the plot, delegation made in favour of the Administrator is not permissible in law having regard to the provisions of the Constitution of India; and
(6) that the rules of natural justice have been violated as the petitioner company, as an owner, was not heard before the impugned order was passed."
The aforesaid questions were all answered against the petitioner-company. It was held that the order requisitioning the said quarry is valid.
*Reported in AIR 1970 Goa 80.
2. Mr. S. V. Shrinathan, learned counsel for the petitioner-company invoked sub-clauses (b) and (c) of Article 133 (1) in support of the prayer for the certificate applied for. Sub-clause (a) was not invoked by him. Sub-clause (b) of Article 133 (1) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the Territory of India if the High Court certifies that the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the like amount or value. The decision rejecting the petition under Article 226 finally determined the rights of the parties in so far as this Court is concerned. It is, therefore, a judgment or final order within the meaning of Article 133 (1). The proceeding disposed of by the said decision is of a civil nature concerned with the civil rights of the parties. It is, therefore, a civil proceeding. In Ramesh v. Gendalal, AIR 1966 SC 1445, Hidayatullah, J., (as he then was), speaking for the Supreme Court, observed at page 1447 :-
"The term civil proceeding has been held in this Court to include, at least all proceedings affecting civil rights, which are not criminal. The dichotomy between civil and criminal proceedings made by the Civil Law Jurists is apparently followed in Articles 133 and 134 and any proceeding affecting civil i.e., in private rights, which is not criminal in nature, is civil. This view was expressed recently by this Court in Narayan Row v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas, AIR 1965 SC 1818. Shah, J., speaking for the majority, first summarises all the provisions in the Constit
