The grant of a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) for appeal to the Supreme Court is discretionary and requires the High Court to consider whether substantial questions of law and general public importance are involved.

ORDER :- This is a petition for grant of a certificate under sub-clause (c) of Clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution. The material facts leading to this petition are explained in the order passed by this Court dated 24th June, 1967*whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioner Joao da Costa Pereira was dismissed on four grounds : (1) that the petitioner was not an aggrieved party because the tests of 'standing' and 'injury' were not satisfied; (2) that the petition was filed after considerable delay; (3) that assuming the petition is maintainable even then the State action in appointing the Committee to manage the affairs of the 'Hospicio' was not arbitrary; and (4) that a writ of mandamus or any direction or order issued against the respondents would be futile because the respondents cannot convene a meeting of the General Body and the Governing Council of the 'Hospicio' for lack of quorum.

*Reported in AIR 1968 Goa 3.

2. Sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 133 provides that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court if the High Court certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. This sub-clause is wider in scope than sub-clauses (a) and (b) of this Article. It is possible to conceive of cases which, in terms of the amount or value, do not satisfy the requirements of sub-clauses (a) and (b), and yet they may fall under sub-clause (c). The discretion of the High Court under this sub-clause is a judicial one and must be judicially exercised along the well established lines which govern these matters. Nar Singh v. State of U. P., AIR 1954 SC 457. A party aggrieved has a right to apply for a certificate end it is for the High Court to consider whether it should be granted. This sub-clause does not confer an unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court.

3. Shri D'Souza, learned Counsel for the petitioner, argues that the questions involved in the writ petition are substantial questions of law and further they are of general public importance and, therefore, the certificate applied for should be granted. Shri S. Tamba, learned Government Pleader for the respondents, joins issue and he contends that the questions involved are primarily questions of fact. They are neither substantial questions of law nor of general importance and hence the certificate applied for should be refused.

4. What is a 'substantial question of law' for the purposes of sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (1) of Article 133 has been explained by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the following words :

"The proper test for determining whether a question of law ..................... is substantial would ..................... be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." (Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co., Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 (1318)).

Shri D'Souza submits that the construction of relevant by-laws and Legislative Diplomas is a question of law. This is so but for the purposes of sub-clause (c) this requirement is not enough. The additional requirement - and a decisive one - is that there should be a substantial question of law for consideration. It is stated by Shri D'Souza that this Court did not correctly construe relevant by-laws and Legislative Diplomas and, as a result of this error, the Court recorded wrong conclusions, namely, that t

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