The main legal point established in the judgment is that the jurisdiction of the civil Court was not barred to decide the question of whether the temple is a public trust or not, and that the suit against the entry in the register of public trusts pursuant to the findings of the Assistant Commissioner/Commissioner was maintainable.

S.N. Jha, CJ.-This special appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 011.2005 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1229/1989 dismissing the writ petition of the appellants. The appellants had filed the writ petition for quashing the order of the Commissioner Devasthan dated 19.09.1983 and the notification dated 01.08.1988 published in the gazette dated 08.09.1988 contained respectively in Annexures-4 and 5 to the writ petition. The appellants also sought a writ of prohibition restraining the respondents from interfering with their right to receive the bhents and offerings and manage the temple.

2. The dispute relates to a temple known as Shri Vijyasan Mataji at Indergarh within Bundi district. Case of the appellants is that the temple was founded by their ancestors, Shri Kamal Nathji Maharaj in or about Vikram Svt. 103 and his descendants have been performing Sewa Pooja and managing the temple. They receive offerings and `Bhent made by the devotees. In short, the temple is a private temple of the appellants. On 13.08.1980 on representation of the then Sarpanch, Mohanpura Gram Panchayat, a proceeding was initiated for registration of the temple as a public trust. After inquiry the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department, Kota by order dated 07.04.1983 held that the temple is a public trust, and ordered for constitution of an executive committee headed by Naib Tehsildar to manage the temple. Against that order the appellants preferred appeal before the Commissioner, Devasthan contending that the temple is a private temple, and it can be managed only by followers of Nath Sampraday and the management cannot be entrusted to outsiders. The offerings and Chadavas constitute source of livelihood to the appellants and their families and the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan was not justified in holding the temple to be a public trust and directing its management by an executive committee. The Commissioner Devasthan by order dated 19.09.1983 affirmed the finding of the Assistant Commissioner regarding the temple being a public trust but held that appellants alone are entitled to perform pooja and accept the offerings made in the temple, and accordingly set aside part of the order of the Assistant Commissioner directing constitution of the executive committee and to that extent, allowed the appeal in part.

3. It is the admitted position that the order of the Commissioner, Devasthan was not challenged either by the appellants or any other person and thus became final. Nothing seems to have happened in the matter until 01.08.1988 when on receipt of the approval of the State government vide letter dated 06.07.1988, notification was issued adding the temple to the list of the government supurdagi temples. It was published in the official gazette on 08.09.1988. The appellants preferred the writ petition challenging the order of the Devasthan Commissioner, and the notification, and seeking direction as mentioned above.

4. In the writ petition the appellants highlighted the fact that the finding of the Commissioner, Devasthan upholding the rights of the appellants to perform Pooja and receive the offerings in the temple was not challenged by the Sarpanch, Mohanpura Gram Panchayat at whose instance proceeding had been initiated or any other person, and contended that the finding that the temple was a public trust was incorrect and void ab initio. To support the plea the appellants enclosed certain documents, some of which were referred to at the time of hearing of this appeal.

5. We have perused the orders of the Assistant Commissioner dated 07.04.1983 and the Commissioner, Devasthan dated 19.09.1983 The finding that the temple is a public trust is based on a detailed consideration of evidence after contest and there is little scope for interference in writ jurisdiction. It is to be kept in mind that the Commissioner set aside only part of the order of Assistant Commissioner to the extent of constitution of