A substantial question of law arises when a material document is completely ignored by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, and an appeal is maintainable in such cases.

N.C. Sharma, J.-This is an appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, by M/s. Mehta Printing Industries against the judgment dated May 5, 1987 passed by the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, Pali.

2. Facts in brief are that on November 29, 1984, respondent Lila Devi filed an application before the Workmen’ s Compensation Commissioner, Pali, for grant of compensation on account of the personal loss sustained by her due to the death of her husband Balkishan in the course of his employment with the appellant. It was alleged by Lila Devi that her husband Balkishan was a workman employed by the appellant on October 6, 1984. Balkishan died on that day as he fell in the well during the course of his employment with the appellant as his duty was to maintain the pipe connecting the well. The monthly wages of the deceased were stated to be Rs. 900/-and he was 26 years of age at the time of his death.

3. Theclaim of Lila Devi was contested by the appellant who denied the employment of Balkishan with it. It was pleaded by the appellant that it carried on its cloth printing business in the premises of Sunder Devi which it had taken on rent. It was alleged that one Gyanchand Bhandari had undertaken to repair the pipe fitting connecting the well. This well did not belong to the appellant. According to the appellant, Balkishan was in employment under Gyanchand Bhandari and, therefore, the appellant was not liable for any compensation arising on account of his death during the course of his employment under Gyanchand Bhandari.

4. TheWorkmen’s Compensation Commissioner framed five issues in the case. He came to the conclusion that Balkishan was in employment under the appellant. It was found that the appellant used the water from the well in the premises of Sunder Devi for his printing business purpose. It was stated that Sunder Devi supplied water to the appellant as part of her trade and the appellant was an agent of Sunder Devi when he got the tube-well repaired through Gyanchand Bhandari. On these facts also, it was found that Balkishan was a workman under the appellant. The age of Balkishan at the time of his death was held to be 26 years and his wages were found to be Rs. 30/-per day. Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner determined the compensation amount at Rs. 67,167.30 and made the same payable with interest at 6 per cent per annum to be calculated from October 6, 1984. M/s. Mehta Printing Industries has come in appeal against the judgment.

5. It was urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant that there was no evidence to establish that Balkishan was a workman in employment under the appellant. It was contended that the burden of proof was on the respondent to establish that Balkishan was an employee of the appellant which she has failed to discharge. It was also urged that the respondent herself had produced a certified copy of the first information report lodged by Gyanchand Bhandari on October 6, 1984 and in this first information report Gyanchand Bhandari had mentioned that Balkishan was in his employment on a daily wage of Rs. 15/-and he died while he was working in the employment of Gyanchand Bhandari.

6. Asagainst this, the learned Counsel for the respondent urged that by virtue of first proviso to Section 30

(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, no appeal lies against any order unless a substantial question of law was involved in the appeal and according to him, in the instant case no substantial question of law was involved and, therefore, this appeal was not maintainable. It was also urged that even if it is taken that Balkishan was employed by Gyanchand Bhandari, the latter was a contractor and the principal was the appellant and on account of the provisions contained in Section 12 of the Act, the appellant was still liable to pay compensation.

7. It is true that no appeal lies against any order mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act unless a substantial question of law is