The provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1965 relating to the sale of adulterated food, the requirement of written consent or authorization for prosecution, and the interpretation of statutory provisions.

( 1 ) ON April 26, 1980 PW-1 Ranjeet Singh, the then Food Inspector Niwai Distt. Tonk (Raj) noticed Lal Chand petitioner offering, besides other foodstuffs. chillies powder for sale at his shop at Niwai. After informing the petitioner of his intention to get the chillies powder examined by Public Analyst for proof of adulteration, if any, therein the Food Inspector purchased 600 grams of chillies powder for Rs. 6/- only, prepared three samples therewith, sent one of them to the Public Analyst for analysis and deposited the remaining two with the Local (Health) Authority.

( 2 ) ON analysis the Public Analyst reported that the sample of chillies powder was adulterated as the same did not conform to the prescribed standard of purity. The sample powder contained non-permitted coaltar Die of "red Shade" as well. The Food Inspector there upon obtained the requisite written consent of the Local (Health) Authority, Tonk and filed a complaint against the petitioner in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tonk. The learned Magistrate tried the petitioner on charge u/s. 7d of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (the Act) and found him guilty thereof. He accordingly convicted the appellant therefor and sentenced him u/s. 16 (1) of the Act to one year Rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/ -. The appeal preferred by the petitioner against his conviction and sentence having been dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge, Tonk, the petitioner has approached this Court in revision u/s. 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Cr. P. C. ).

( 3 ) MR. Inder Raj Saini, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Court, below did not correctly appreciate the evidence on record and, therefor, the findings recorded by them regarding the quilt of the petitioner were not correct. In this behalf Mr. Saini pointed out that the petitioner simply ran a hotel at the relevant time and he was not a dealer in chillies powder and therefore, sale of chillies powder by him to the Food Inspector did not amount to sale for the purposes of the Act. I find no force in this argument.

( 4 ) THE definition of the term "food" as given in Section 2 (v) of the Act after its substitution by Amendment Act No. 34 of 1976 provides that "food" means any article used as food or drink for human consumption other than drugs and water and inter alia, includes any article which ordinarily enters into or is used in the composition or preparation of human food. A study of this definition of "food" disclose that any article used as food or drink for human consumption (not being drugs or water) and any article which ordinarily enters into or is used in the composition or preparation of human food would fall within the ambit of this definition. To regard an article as food for the purposes of the Act it is not necessary that it should be described or exhibited as intended for human consumption or for preparation of food. It is enough if the article is generally or commonly used for human consumption or the preparation of human food. It can hardly be disputed that chillies powder is commonly used for preparation of human food. It therefore, clearly falls within the purview of the definition of the term "food" as given in Section 2 (v) of the Act.

( 5 ) SECTION 2 (xiii) of the Act defines the term "sale" in following words :- (xiii) "sale" with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means the sale of any article of food whether for cash or on credit or by way of exchange and whether by wholesale or retail, for human consumption for use or for analysis and includes an agreement for sale or offer for sale, the exposing for sale or having in possession for sale of any such article, and includes also an attempt to sell any such article.

( 6 ) A plain reading, of the above definition clearly informs that the Act gives in Section 2 (xiii) a special definition of the term "sale". The definition specially includes within its a