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1997 Supreme(Raj) 607
High Court Of Rajasthan
Judgename : B.R.ARORA,A.K.SINGH
DEO KISHAN - Appellant
Versus
U.I.T., BIKANER - Respondent
CIV. SPECIAL APPEAL 932 Of 1995
Decided On : 08/12/1997
G.S.PATAVAT, S.C.SINGHVI, S.L.JAIN
The right to obtain a lease deed from the U.I.T. is a statutory right arising from the U.I.T. Act and Rules, not a contractual right.
Headnote:
U.I.T. ACT - RULES 20, 26 - LEASE DEED EXECUTION - STATUTORY RIGHT - DELAY IN FILING WRIT PETITION - RECURRING CAUSE OF ACTION - NO TIME LIMIT FOR EXECUTION OF LEASE DEED.
Fact of the Case:
Appellant bid and won an auction for a plot from the U.I.T. and paid the full amount. He obtained permission to construct a house and built one. Despite repeated requests, the U.I.T. did not execute the lease deed. The appellant filed a writ petition, which was dismissed as the court held that the right to the lease deed arose from a contractual obligation and the petition was belated. The appellant appealed.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the right to obtain a lease deed from the U.I.T. is a statutory right arising from the U.I.T. Act and Rules, not a contractual right. The delay in filing the writ petition was not fatal as the cause of action was recurring daily.
Issues: 1. Whether the right to obtain a lease deed from the U.I.T. is a statutory or contractual right? 2. Whether the writ petition was belated?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The U.I.T. is created under the authority of law and its functions and obligations are governed by the U.I.T. Act and Rules. The rights and obligations arising from the U.I.T. Act and Rules are statutory, not contractual. 2. The right to obtain a lease deed from the U.I.T. is governed by Rules 20 and 26 of the U.I.T. Rules. These rules do not specify any time limit for the execution of the lease deed. Therefore, the writ petition cannot be considered belated.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, the order of the single judge was quashed, and the writ petition was remanded for disposal according to law.
AMARESH KU. SINGH, J.
( 1 ) HEARD the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1.
( 2 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order dated 19th Dec. 1994 passed by the learned single Judge in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5655/94 whereby the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant on the ground that the writ petition had arisen out of contractual obligation and the petitioner desired a direction that the respondents may be asked to execute lease deed in his favour. It was also observed by the learned single Judge that the writ petition was belated.
( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant (petitioner) has submitted that both the grounds on which writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed, were not sufficient to dismiss the writ petition because the right of the appellant to get lease deed executed in his favour did not arise from any private contract but it had its origin in the Rules made by the Government under the U. I. T. Act and, therefore, the right of the appellant to get the lease deed executed by the respondent No. 1 in his favour had statutory origin rather than a contractual origin as pointed out by the learned single Judge. Regarding the second ground, on which the writ petition was dismissed, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the writ petition was not belated as pointed out by the learned single Judge because the appellant (petitioner) had been repeatedly asking the respondent No. 1 to execute the lease deed and the right to get the lease deed executed in his favour does not come to an end so long he is in the possession of the property in accordance with the terms and conditions of agreement for lease and the rules.
( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents has supported the order passed by the learned single Judge and added that the appellant has constructed a building in the leasehold plot without obtaining permission from the U. I. T. and that he had encroached upon a strip of adjoining land and thereby contravened the terms and conditions of the licence granted in his favour.
( 5 ) AT the outset it would be proper to point out that the respondents had no opportunity to file the reply before the learned single Judge. Therefore, in this appeal we do not deem it fit to decide whether the appellant constructed a building on the leasehold land without obtaining permission from the U. I. T. or he committed any encroachment on the adjoining land. The respondent would be free to raise such objections as they deem fit, on the basis of the allegation that the appellant has constructed a house without obtaining permission from the U. I. T. and committed trespass on the adjoining land, in their reply.
( 6 ) IN the present appeal, we, are, concerned with the question whether the dismissal of the writ petition by the learned single Judge on the ground that the right claimed was contractual in origin and the writ petition was belated was unjustified.
( 7 ) A bare perusal of the provisions of the U. I. T. Act, 1951 and the Rules made thereunder show that U. I. Ts. have been created under the authority of law for the purpose indicated by the U. I. T. Act. The functions which are to be performed by the U. I. T. , are regulated by the provisions of the U. I. T. Act and Rules made thereunder. The rights and obligations of the U. I. T. are governed by the provisions of the U. I. T. Act and the Rules. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that the U. I. T. is as free as private citizens in the matter of entering into the contracts and settling the terms and conditions of contracts. For the same reason private persons who want to obtain plots of land from the U. I. T. , whether on lease or otherwise, have to comply with the provisions of the U. I. T. Act and the Rules. They cannot be permitted to act in contravention of the U. I. T. Act and the Rules. Viewed in this light, the rights and obligations which are crea
