The Executive Magistrate does not have the jurisdiction to proceed with the matter under Section 145 of the Code and to attach the land in dispute if the party in possession has been in possession for a period of more than two months next before the report was received by the Executive Magistrate.

N. C. KOCHAR, J.

( 1 ) THE facts giving rise to this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code) against the order dated 15-6-1993 passed by the learned Executive Magistrate, Dudu District - Jaipur in Criminal Case No. 6/91, are as under :-

( 2 ) A report dated 19-12-1991 was received by the learned Executive Magistrate, Dudu from the police that there was likelihood of breach of peace as there was dispute regarding the possession of the land in dispute measuring 302 bighas and 8 biswas situated in village Kanwa Kalan Tehsil -Dudu District - Jaipur. On receipt of this report, an order under Sub-Section (1) of Section 145 of the Code was passed by the learned Executive Magistrate on 7-1-1992 and a preliminary order for attachment of the land in dispute was also passed and the Tehsildar was appointed as the receiver. After the parties submitted their written statements in regard to the possession of the land in dispute, the learned Executive Magistrate, vide the impugned order dated 15-6-1993 has observed that he is unable to decide as to which party was in possession of the land in dispute at the relevant time and directed that the receiver should continue in possession of the land in dispute till the matter is decided by the appropriate Court. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners have approached this Court by filing this petition.

( 3 ) NOTICE of the petition was issued to the respondents.

( 4 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the impugned order and the record of the case.

( 5 ) IN the impugned order itself it has been mentioned that the trouble started on 3-10-1991 when the petitioners wanted to reap the crops of bajara, jwaar and til sown by them and the respondents (other than the State) were agitating that they had no right to have grown the crops there on and to reap as the land in dispute was meant for being used as grazing land only and although the Khatedari right had been got recorded by the petitioners, it had been agreed that the land would be used only for grazing purposes. The impugned order further shows that on 13-10-1991, some occurrence took place in which one person died and others received grievous injuries and cross cases were registered under Section 302 and 326 IPC at the police station concerned. The report, therefore, shows that although the dispute did exist in regard to the possession of the land, but the impugned order further shows that the dispute. was in regard to sowing of the crops above aid by the petitioner and their right to reap the same. Once it is not disputed that the crops had been sown by the petitioners in the land in dispute and the crops were ready for reaping on 13-10-1991 it is apparent that it must have taken more than two months for being reaped after the date when the seeds were sown by the petitioners in the land in dispute. The relevant provisions of Section 145 of the Code may be reproduced with advantage for deciding as to whether the learned Executive Magistrate had the power to proceed with the matter under that Section and to attach the land in dispute and the said relevant provisions are as under :-"145. Procedure where dispute concerning land or water is likely to cause breach of peace.- (1) Wherever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace exists concerning any land or water of the boundaries thereof, within his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. (2) to (3 ). . . . (4) The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits of the claims of any of the parties to a right t