A compromise decree cannot be set aside under Section 151 of the CPC on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation. The proper remedy is to file a suit for cancellation of the decree under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act.

N. C. SHARMA, J.

( 1 ) THIS is a revision petition by Smt. Mohan Bai against the order of the District Judge, Udaipur dt. Mar. 10, 1986, dismissing the application filed by the petitioner u/s. 151 of the Civil P. C. on 29th June, 1982 in his Court for setting aside the final decree, which had been passed by the District Judge, Udaipur in the suit for redemption which had been filed by Jai Kishan since dead and represented by the non-petitioners.

( 2 ) FACTS leading to the filing of this revision petition are that Jaikishan had instituted a civil suit on Nov. 21, 1975 against the petitioner for redemption of mortgage of certain house property which had been usufructuarily mortgaged by him on May 16, 1953 after borrowing a sum of Rs. 2999/- from the petitioner. In the redemption suit, the plaintiff Jai Kishan had stated that he had allowed Smt. Mohan Bai, petitioner to expend a mount to the extent of Rs. 2100/- in the said house. It was stated that the petitioner did not make additions in the number of rooms in the property mortgaged, but she dismantled a latrine and started using "owari" in the house as latrine. Thereupon, Jaikishan asked the petitioner and her husband to redeem the mortgaged property from mortgage after taking the mortgage amount and further amount, if any, expended by her. Since the petitioner did not re-deliver the property after redeeming the mortgage, Jaikishan filed the suit for redemption. In that suit, petitioner admitted the factum of mortgage. However, she alleged that she had incurred an amount of about Rs. 7615. 85 in making additions in mortgaged property and claimed that amount in addition to the mortgage amount before redemption. A preliminary decree was passed by the trial Court on May 16, 1953 for redemption of mortgaged property on deposit of payment by the plaintiff of the amount of Rs. 2999/- as mortgage money and Rs. 3997. 45/- as the amount incurred by the mortgagee in certain constructions or repairs in the mortgaged property. The plaintiff deposited this amount in the trial court. Aggrieved by the preliminary decree, Smt. Mohan Bai defendant filed First Appeal No. 109 of 1981 in the Court of the District Judge, Udaipur. During the course of that appeal, a compromise was filed which was signed by the plaintiff Jai Kishan and his counsel and on behalf of Smt. Mohan Bai, defendant, the compromise was signed by her advocate Mr. Bansilal. The compromise was verified by the District Judge, Udaipur on Mar. 12, 1982 and the suit of Jai Kishan was decreed in accordance with the compromise.

( 3 ) AS against the compromise decree dt. Mar. 12, 1982 passed by the District Judge, Udaipur in Civil Appeal No. 109/81, Mohan Bai filed Civil Second Appeal No. 101/83 (82 ?) before this court. In that Second Appeal, the counsel for Mohan Bai, defendant petitioner challenged the compromise decree on the ground that the compromise on the basis of which the decree was passed, was not signed by the defendant Mohan Bai and was signed only by her advocate Mr. Bansilal. It was urged in the Second Appeal that according to the provisions of O. 23, R. 3, C. P. C. as amended by the Amending Act No. 104 of 1976, before a compromise can be given effect to by the Court under O. 23, R. 3, C. P. C. , it should be signed by the party himself and a compromise cannot be acted upon by the Court if it is signed merely by the Advocate of the party. The second appeal was dismissed by the Honble Justice Shri D. P. Gupta on Jan. 2, 1983. The judgement of His Lordship is reported in 1983 Rajasthan LR 365. It would appear from para 5 of the reported judgement that his Lordship did not accept the contention of defendant Mohan Bai that the amended provision of O. 23, R. 3 C. P. C. indicated that the compromise petition signed only by the advocates of the parties would not be given effect to by the Court and after referring to the decision of the Privy Council reported in AIR 1930 PC 158 and to the decision of the Nagpur High C