1983 Supreme(Raj) 143
High Court Of Rajasthan
Judgename : K.S.Lodha
CHHOTU KHAN AND ANR. - Appellant
Versus
JEEWAN KHAN AND ORS. - Respondent
Civil Misc. Appeal 203 Of 1974
Decided On : 07/28/1983
Babulal Purohit, Dalpat Rai
The starting point of limitation for filing an application for the filing of an award in court under Article 119 of the Limitation Act is the date of service of the notice in writing of the making of the award as contemplated by Section 14 (1) of the Arbitration Act.
Headnote:
ARBITRATION - LIMITATION - STARTING POINT - NOTICE IN WRITING - SECTION 14 (1) OF THE ARBITRATION ACT - MERE SIGNING BY THE PARTIES ON THE AWARD AFTER IT HAS BEEN MADE AND SIGNED BY THE ARBITRATOR DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A NOTICE IN WRITING - LIMITATION UNDER SECTION 119 OF THE LIMITATION ACT WOULD NOT START RUNNING FROM THE DATE OF THE SIGNING OF THE AWARD IN THIS MANNER BUT WOULD RUN ONLY WHEN A NOTICE IN WRITING IS SERVED UPON THE PARTY AS CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 14 (1) OF THE ARBITRATION ACT.
Fact of the Case:
The dispute was referred to arbitration. The arbitrators made their award and obtained the signatures of the parties on the award. A notice of the making and signing of the award was issued by the arbitrators on 19-5-1973 and it was received by the appellants on 25-5-1973. On 2-7-1973, the appellants filed an application before the court praying that the arbitrators may be directed to file the award and a decree in terms of the award may be passed with costs. The application was opposed by the respondents on the ground that it was barred by time under Article 119 of the Limitation Act.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the mere signing by the parties on the award after it has been made and signed by the arbitrator does not amount to a notice in writing envisaged by Section 14 (1) of the Arbitration Act and the limitation Under Section 119 of the Limitation Act would not start running from the date of the signing of the award in this manner but would run only when a notice in writing is served upon the party as contemplated by Section 14 (1) of the Arbitration Act.
Issues: Whether the mere signing by the parties on the award after it has been made and signed by the arbitrator amounts to a notice in writing envisaged by Section 14 (1) of the Arbitration Act?
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the Arbitration Act, which requires a notice in writing to be given to the parties of the making and signing of the award. The court also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Parasramka Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (AIR 1970 SC 1654), which held that a notice in writing must be in writing and must intimate quite clearly that the award has been made and signed.
Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the lower court, and sent the case back to that court for being proceeded with further in accordance with law.
K. S. LODHA, J.
( 1 ) THE dispute in this case lies in a very narrow compass. The parties had referred their dispute to the arbitrators. The arbitrators after hearing the parties, made their award, pronounced and signed it in the presence of the partres on 11-2-1973 and also obtained the signatures of the parties on the award. Thereafter a notice of the making and signing of the award Under Section 14 (1) of the Arbitration Act was issued by the arbitrators on 19-5-1973 and it was received by Chhptu Khan and others, the present appellants on 255-1973. On 2-7-1973. Chhotu Khan and others filed an application before the court of the learned District Judge. Bikaner praying that the arbitrators may be directed to file the award and a decree in terms of the award may be passed with costs. This application was opposed by the respondents-non-applicants Jeewan Khan and others on the ground that it was barred by time under Article 119 of the Limitation Act. The learned District Judge after hearing the parties, accepted this objection and rejected the appellants application as being barred by time by his order dated 22-7-1974. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed by Chhotu Khan and others.
( 2 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.
( 3 ) THERE is no dispute about the facts. The only question in dispute is the starting point of limitation. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the starting point of limitation under Article 119 of the Indian Arbitration Act was the date of the service of the notice Under Section 14 (1) of the Arbitration Act i. e. 25-5-73. If this contention is accepted, the application is admittedly in time. On the other hand, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the starting point of limitation was 11-2-1973 itself when the award was signed by the parties after it had been made and signed by the arbitrators and it amounted to a notice contemplated by Section 14 (l) of the Arbitration Act. If this contention is accepted, then the application was admittedly barred by time.
( 4 ) I have given my careful consideration to the rival contentions. In arriving at the finding that the application is barred by time. The, learned District Judge has placed reliance upon Nilkantha v. Kashinath (AIR 1962 SC 666 ). Parasramka Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1970 SC 1654) and K. Moinuddin v. U. Veeraiah (AIR 1971 Andh Pra 318v Therefore, let me first examine the question whether according to these authorities, the starting point of limitation in the present case would have been 11-2-1973 as held bv the learned District Judge- Before I deal with these authorities, it may be mentioned that Article 119 of the Limitation Act provides thirty days time from the date of the service of the notice of the making of the award for the filing in the court for an awardi The notice of making of the award clearly refers to the notice envisaged by Section 14 (1) of the Indian Arbitration Act. That section reads "when the arbitrators or umpire have made their award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and award. " (The underlining is mine.) Therefore, according to this section, the notice must be in writing. The authorities relied upon by the learned District Judge also have found that the notice has to be in writing. The relevant observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Parasramka Commercial Co. Ltd. s case (AIR 1970 SC 1654) (supra) are as under (at p. 1656):
"reading the word notice as we generally do, it denotes merely an intimation to the party concerned of a particular fact. It seems to us that we cannot limit the words "notice in writing" to only a letter. Notice may take several forms. It must, to be sufficient, be in writing and must intimate quite clear