Criminal proceedings involving moral turpitude are considered pending trial even before the framing of charges, and the suspension of a Sarpanch under Section 17 (4a) of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953, during such proceedings is valid and constitutional.

N. M. KASLIWAL, J.

( 1 ) THIS writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed, challenging the order dt. 8th April, 1983, passed by Avar Sachiv (Janch) Gramin Vikas Evam Panchayati Raj Department, Rajasthan Jaipur, suspending the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Memasar, Panchayat Samiti Sri Dungargarh, District Churu. The petitioner was elected Sarpanch of the above-mentioned Panchayat on 10th December, 1981.

( 2 ) THE case of the petitioner is that on a complaint filed by one Dana Ram Choudhary, a challan has been filed against the petitioner on 11th March, 1982. under Sections 467, 471, and 408 IPC in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Churu. In view of the aforesaid criminal proceedings lodged against the petitioner, the State Government has suspended the petitioner under Section 17 (4a) of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The short controversy raised by the petitioner in this writ petition is that under Section 17 (4a) of the Act the State Government could have suspended the petitioner only when criminal proceedings in regard to an offence involving moral turpitude were pending trial in a court of law. The contention of the petitioner is that so far no charge has been framed against the petitioner and as such no trial is pending against him and the State Government is not empowered to suspend the petitioner under the aforesaid provisions of Section 17 (4a) of the Act It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the trial only commences after framing of charge and till that stage reaches in a criminal proceeding H cannot be said that any trial was pending against the petitioner in regard lo an offence involving moral turpitude. Reliance is placed on Sarkar v. Madho Ram, AIR 1950 Raj 34 : (51 Cri LJ 1522),

( 3 ) ON the other hand, it was contended by Mr. Mathur, learned Additional Government Advocate that as soon as a challan is filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the criminal proceedings will be said to be pending for trial in a court of law and it is not necessary to frame a charge to hold that a trial is pending in a court of law. Reliance is placed on Mahesh Desai v. Ram Naresh Pandey, AIR 1957 SC 389: (1957 Cri LJ 567) and Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh AIR 1957 SC 444.

( 4 ) THE Criminal P. C. , 1973 defines inquiry and investigation under Section 2 (g) and (h) but the word trial has not been defined in the said Code. Under Section 2 (g) inquiry means every inquiry other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court. investigation under Section 2 (h) is defined as including all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf. A perusal of the aforesaid two definitions clearly shows that the proceedings pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate are neither inquiry nor investigation as defined under the Criminal P. C. Inquiry has been defined as meaning every inquiry other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court. After filing a challan by a police officer before a Magistrate, the procedure has to be adopted as contemplated under Chapter XIX of the Cri. P. C. Under Section 239 if, upon considering the police report and the document sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused, an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing. Under Section 240, if upon such consideration, if any, and hearing, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is compete