In a democratic institution, a person who has lost the confidence of the majority of the members should not be allowed to stay against their will, and the court should be reluctant to interfere with such a decision.

V. P. TYAGI, ACTG. C. J.

( 1 ) THIS appeal of Bhure Khan is directed against the Judgment of the learned single Judge dated October 9, 1975 dismissing the writ petition of Bhure Khan against whom vote of no-confidence was passed in a meeting presided over by the acting Tehsildar.

( 2 ) BHURE Khan was elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Kayamser Dhandhoori having a total strength of 12 members only. A requisition was presented by the members of the Panchayat expressing their desire to pass a vote of no-confidence against the petitioner. The Additional District Development Officer by his order dated 7th April, 1975 appointed Tehsildar Jhunjhunu to preside over the meeting. It so appears that the Tehsildar on the day of meeting was on leave and, therefore, Naib Tehsildar Jhunjhunu who was acting as Tehsildar presided over that meeting. The meeting was attended by the appellant Bhure khan also. Out of 10 members of the Panchayat who attended the meeting 9 voted against Bhure Khan with a result that the acting Tehsildar declared that bhure Khan had lost confidence of the Panchayat. The proceedings taken in the meeting of the Panchayat were then challenged by Bhure Khan by preferring a writ petition before this Court mainly on the ground that the acting Tehsildar had no authority to preside over the meeting convened on April 24, 1975 to discuss the vote of no-confidence. The learned Judge after considering various authorities cited before him held that the acting Tehsildar was competent to conduct the meeting and specially when no bias or prejudice was imputed to the Presiding officer. The learned Judge did not find it proper and just to interfere with the result of the meeting. While dismissing the petition of Bhure khan, the learned Judge observed:-

"it is well settled principle of democracy that the person who has lost the confidence of the members of a democratic institution should not be allowed to stay against the will of the members of that institution. The writ of mandamus or certiorari does not issue as a matter of coarse but is a writ of discretionary nature. . . . . . . . . . "

( 3 ) LEARNED Government Advocate and the counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents raised a preliminary issue before this Court that even if this Court comes to the conclusion that the officiating Tehsildar had no authority to preside over the meeting, the court should not interfere with the judgment of the learned single Judge who has dismissed the appellants writ petition on a consideration well founded in the democratic world and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed without going into the merits of the matter raised by the appellant. In support of this preliminary objection reliance has been placed on an authority of this Court in Radhey Shyam v. Vijai Singh, District Magistrate, ganganagar, 1972 WLN 772.

( 4 ) THE facts mentioned above have not been disputed by the parties. It is also admitted by Mr. Agrawal appearing on behalf of the appellant that the objection raised by him is undoubtedly of a highly technical nature but his contention is that in democracy when the meeting is to be conducted in a prescribed manner, it should be done strictly in accordance with the procedure laid down by the law otherwise in the eye of law the meeting conducted in contravention of the prescribed procedure shall be deemed as if no meeting had ever taken place and, therefore, if the meeting was presided over by an officer who was not competent under the law, it cannot be said that the intention of the members was correctly found out,

( 5 ) IN Radhey Shyams case 1972 WLN 772 the notice for convening a meeting issued by the Collector was defective inasmuch as it did not comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 72 (3) of the Act but that defect in the notice did not in any manner affect the opinion of the members and, therefore, this court observed that.

"it is true that when the mandatory provisions of law have been violated while de