A court has the inherent power to vary an order of interim maintenance granted under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, in appropriate cases, such as when there is a change in circumstances.

KAN SINGH, J.

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal by a wife directed against an order of the learned District judge, Bikaner dated 12-8-1969 whereby the learned Judge reduced the amount of interim maintenance granted to the wife under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage act. 1955, hereinafter to be referred as the "act", from Rs. 70/- per month to Rs. 40/- per month.

( 2 ) SHRI Purshotam Kewalia, the husband of the appellant had applied for judicial separation against the appellant wife under Section 10 of the Act. On the wifes application under Section 24 of the Act the learned Judge allowed Rs. 70/-per month as interim maintenance to the wife on 30-9-1967. Subsequently on the husbands application the learned Judge reduced the amount of interim maintenance to Rs. 40/- per month only by the order under appeal.

( 3 ) A twofold contention is advanced by learned counsel for the ap-pellant in assailing the order of the learned District Judge. In the first place, it is submitted that once an order of interim maintenance has been passed by the learned Judge, he has no jurisdiction to vary that order and reduce the amount. Attention is invited to the provisions of Section 25 of the Act with a view to showing that whereas the power to vary order of permanent maintenance granted has been conferred on a Court, under that section no corresponding provision has been made under Section 24 of the Act and thus the intention of the legislature was mainfest that under Section 24 the Court should not have the power to vary the order of maintenance. In the second place, it is contended that no new events or circumstances had come into existence to warrant the variation of the order for maintenance in favour of the husband. Learned counsel for the appellant maintains that when the order for maintenance was passed on 14-10-67 the husbands income was taken to be Rs. 2,000/- a year and this continued to be so subsequently. He referred me to a review application moved by the husband on 711-1967 in which the husband had admitted that he was getting Rs. 70/- per month from the Press Trust of India and Rs. 100/-per month as honorarium from all India Radio; total Rs. 170/- per month. Learned counsel proceeded to say that in the subsequent application for reduction of the amount the husband has nowhere alleged that these two sources of income were lost to him. On the other hand, he had only stated that he was no longer the correspondent of Hindustan times, Indian Express or National Herald. Then the learned counsel drew attention to the fact that the letter produced by the husband purporting to be from the hindus-tan Times terminating his employment as correspondent is dated 1-61967, while the order for maintenance was passed on 14-10-1967.

( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, argues that a Court which has fixed pendente lite maintenance could vary the order and for that there need be no enabling provision like the one contained in Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel pointed out that after the proceedings had terminated on the disposal of the main petition and when the Court had fixed permanent alimony under Section 25 of the Act. in the absence of any enabling provision the Court would be functus officio and it would not be open to it to vary the order which would amount to a decree and it was for that reason that the legislature had to make a provision to enable the Court to vary the order for perman-nent alimony on account of the change in circumstances. He also drew analogy from the provisions of Section 488, Criminal P. C. whereunder a Magistrate fixing maintenance of a wife or a child could vary the order when there is change of circumstances. I find force in the submission of learned counsel for the respondent. Section 24 of the Act vests a wide discretion in a Court in the matter of fixation of pendente lite maintenance and costs of the proceedings. The discretion, however, has to be exercised judicially. If there is no ena