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1964 Supreme(Raj) 223
High Court Of Rajasthan
Judgename : D.S.Dave,Kan Singh
BHAGATPURA MOTOR TRANSPORT CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD. - Appellant
Versus
K.S.JHALA - Respondent
Civil Writ Petn. 1523 Of 1964
Decided On : 11/23/1964
D.P.GUPTA, M.M.VYAS
The suspension of a registration certificate under Section 33 (1) (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is a quasi-judicial act requiring the authority to act judicially and provide an opportunity of hearing to the affected party. Failure to provide such an opportunity violates the principles of natural justice.
Headnote:
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - SECTION 33 (1) (B) - SUSPENSION OF REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE - OPPORTUNITY OF HEARING - QUASI-JUDICIAL ACT - MALA FIDES - APPEAL - PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY - LACUNA IN RULES.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, a cooperative society, was granted a non-temporary permit for three years to ply a stage carriage bus on a specific route. The Regional Transport Officer (RTO) suspended the registration certificate of the bus for four months under Section 33 (1) (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for plying the bus on a different route without a valid permit. The petitioner challenged the suspension order, alleging violation of principles of natural justice, mala fides, and improper interpretation of Section 33 (1) (b).
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the suspension of the registration certificate was a quasi-judicial act, requiring the RTO to act judicially and provide an opportunity to the petitioner to make representations and adduce evidence. The court found that the RTO failed to provide such an opportunity and also acted as the final arbiter despite having personal knowledge of the material facts, violating the principles of natural justice. The court further observed that the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to make good its representation and that the RTO, who had personal knowledge of the material facts, had himself decided the matter.
Issues: 1. Whether the suspension of the registration certificate was a quasi-judicial act requiring the RTO to act judicially and provide an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner? 2. Whether the RTO violated the principles of natural justice by not providing an opportunity to the petitioner to make representations and adduce evidence? 3. Whether the RTO acted mala fide in passing the suspension order? 4. Whether there was a lacuna in the Rules regarding the prescribed authority for hearing appeals against orders passed by officers empowered under Rule 67 of the Motor Vehicles Rules?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the suspension of the registration certificate was a quasi-judicial act, requiring the RTO to act judicially and provide an opportunity to the petitioner to make representations and adduce evidence. The court relied on the principles laid down in various Supreme Court judgments, which held that where an authority is empowered by a statute to decide a dispute between parties and there is nothing in the statute to the contrary, the authority is under a duty to act judicially. 2. The court found that the RTO failed to provide an opportunity to the petitioner to make good its representation and that the RTO, who had personal knowledge of the material facts, had himself decided the matter. The court held that this violated the principles of natural justice, as a person who is a witness in the case and has personal knowledge of the facts should not take upon himself the duty of a final arbiter. 3. The court observed that the allegation of mala fides against the RTO was stoutly denied by him and, being a question of fact, the court was not persuaded to go into it, especially in light of its conclusion on the first point. 4. The court noted the lacuna in the Rules regarding the prescribed authority for hearing appeals against orders passed by officers empowered under Rule 67 of the Motor Vehicles Rules and invited the attention of the Government to rectify the same.
Final Decision: The court quashed the suspension order passed by the RTO and directed that no further action be taken against the petitioner in this behalf. The court also ordered parties to bear their own costs.
KAN SINGH, J.
( 1 ) THE petitioner, who is a Cooperative Society registered under the Rajasthan cooperative Societies Act and plies a stage carriage bus-No. R J R 2814, on hanumangarh Dabwali via Sangana route in Ganganagar district, has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order dated 27-8-64 (Ex-4 on the record) passed by respondent No. 1, under Section 33 (b) of the motor Vehicles Act, hereinafter to be referred as the Act, whereby the registration certificate of the vehicle R J R 2814 was suspended for a period of four months.
( 2 ) THE petitioner Messrs. Bhagatpura Motor Transport Co-operative Society limited, Bhagatpura, was granted a non-temporary permit valid for a period of three years on 18-4-63, and normally the permit would be valid upto 17-4-1966. On 27-7-64, respondent No. 1, (Regional Transport Officer) served a notice on the petitioner calling upon him to show cause within a week why its registration certificate be not suspended as the stage carriage bus was found plying on another route Sangaria--45 R. D. on 24-7-1964 carrying passengers. According to the petitioner he gave a reply to the notice denying the correctness of the allegations and asked for an opportunity to explain the exact position personally and for producing the necessary evidence. According to the petitioner, this opportunity was not afforded by the respondent who was not favourably disposed towards it and nurtured personal illwill on account of it having made complaints against the Regional Transport Officer prior to the matter covered by the notice had arisen. The petitioner has, therefore, approached this Court making grievance of the order of the Regional Transport Officer on the ground that the same was passed without proper hearing and in violation of the principles of natural justice.
( 3 ) THE writ petition has been opposed by the respondents. It is averred on their behalf that the bus in question was found plying on Sangaria--45 R. D. route on 24-7-1964, and was caught red handed white it was so plying. Certain tickets issued by the petitioner were also taken in custody by the Sub-Inspector, transport, Ganganagar and respondent No. 1 was himself present. A proper seizure memo was prepared at the spot in the presence of motbirs. It is denied that respondent No. 1 bore any ill will against the petitioner. As regards the contention for not giving of personal hearing, it is submitted that the proceedings were administrative in nature and not quasi judicial. Further it is urged that the respondent No. 1, himself being on the spot, no further enquiry was necessary. The petitioner contended at the time of hearing that the impugned order was bad on account of the following reasons :--
(1) That the respondent No. 1, had violated the principles of natural justice inasmuch as he did not afford opportunity to the petitioner to prove its case by leading evidence when it was demanded of him; (2) That Section 33 (1) (b) of the Act was not attracted as the petitioner had a permit for plying the vehicle for hire or reward. That provision is applicable, according to the petitioner, only when a vehicle had never been permitted to ply for hire or reward. In this connection it is pointed out that in the case of transport vehicles plying for hire or reward, it is only the Regional Transport Authority who can take action under Section 60 of the Act by way of suspending or cancelling a permit; (3) That the action of the respondent No. 1, was mala fide as he bore ill will against the petitioner.
( 4 ) THERE was considerable argument on the second, point about the proper interpretation of Section 33 (1) (b) of the Act, but in view of the conclusion that we have reached on point No. 1, we do not think it will be necessary to deal with the second question. For the purposes of the present case we assume, without deciding, that that section covers even a transport vehicle which has a permit for one route for ply
