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1957 Supreme(Raj) 98

High Court Of Rajasthan
Judgename : Wanchoo,Modi
BIRDICHAND - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF RAJASTHAN - Respondent
Civil Writ Case 74 Of 1956
Decided On : 05/09/1957

Advocates Appeared:
B.K.ACHARYA, Dashrathmal, DEEPCHAND, DULE RAJ

Part IV of the Marwar Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1941, is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it creates a distinction between different parts of Rajasthan, resulting in territorial discrimination. The provisions of Part IV, such as Section 13(2), Section 14(1), and Section 20, are coercive in nature and go beyond the scope of a conciliation tribunal.

Headnote:

MARWAR RELIEF OF INDEBTEDNESS ACT, 1941 - PART IV - DEBT CONCILIATION BOARDS - VALIDITY - DISCRIMINATION - ARTICLE 14 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA - WHETHER PART IV IS A PROGRESSIVE AND AMELIORATIVE LEGISLATION - WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF PART IV ARE COERCIVE AND FOREIGN TO THE FUNCTION OF A CONCILIATION TRIBUNAL - WHETHER PART IV CAN BE KEPT ALIVE AFTER STRIKING DOWN CERTAIN PROVISIONS.

Fact of the Case:

Six connected applications challenging the validity of Part IV of the Marwar Relief of Indebtedness Act of 1941 (the Act) dealing with Debt Conciliation Boards.

Finding of the Court:

1. Part IV of the Act is discriminatory as it is only in force in a part of the State of Rajasthan, which was formerly known as the State of Marwar. 2. The provisions of Part IV are coercive and foreign to the function of a conciliation tribunal. 3. Part IV cannot be kept alive after striking down certain provisions as they are so interwoven into the texture of Part IV that to strike them down means that the whole of Part IV of the Act must be struck down.

Issues: 1. Whether Part IV of the Act is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution? 2. Whether the provisions of Part IV are coercive and foreign to the function of a conciliation tribunal? 3. Whether Part IV can be kept alive after striking down certain provisions?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. Part IV of the Act is discriminatory as it creates a distinction between different parts of Rajasthan, resulting in territorial discrimination. 2. The provisions of Part IV, such as Section 13(2), Section 14(1), and Section 20, are coercive in nature and go beyond the scope of a conciliation tribunal. These provisions impose disabilities on creditors and interfere with Civil Court decrees. 3. Part IV cannot be kept alive after striking down certain provisions as they are so interwoven into the texture of Part IV that to strike them down means that the whole of Part IV of the Act must be struck down.

Final Decision: The Court allowed the applications and held that Part IV of the Act is void as it is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Consequently, the Debt Conciliation Boards established under the Act have no jurisdiction, and the orders passed by the boards in the six cases were quashed.

Judgment


WANCHOO, C. J.

( 1 ) THESE are six connected applications challenging the validity of Part IV of the marwar Relief of Indebtedness Act of 1941 (hereinafter called the Act) dealing with debt Conciliation Boards. We propose to decide these cases by one judgment as the main arguments raised in them are the same.

( 2 ) BEFORE we mention the grounds on which the validity of the provisions of Part IV of the Act is being attacked, we would like briefly to mention the facts of these six cases.

( 3 ) IN Birdichands case (No. 46 of 1955), the Debt Conciliation Board has acted under Section 13 (2) of the Act, and discharged the debt.

( 4 ) IN Civil Writs No. 121 of 1955, No. 158 of 1955, No. 36 of 1956, and 74 of 1956 proceedings are going on the application of the debtors under Section 11 of the act.

( 5 ) IN Civil Writ No. 41 of 1956 also proceedings are going on the application of the debtor under Section 11 of the Act, but in this case besides certain sums due on bahee Khatas, some amount due on a decree of a Court is also involved.

( 6 ) THE case of the applicants is that the Act is only in force in a part of the State of rajasthan, which was formerly known as the State of Marwar. Therefore Part IV of the Act dealing with Debt Conciliation Boards being only in force in a part of the present State of Rajasthan, there is territorial discrimination between different parts of Rajasthan. Further, even in Marwar Part IV has only been brought into force in a few subdivisions like Bali, Nagpur, Merta and Jodhpur, and not in the entire territory covered by the former State of Marwar. Therefore, it is urged that a discrimination between one part of the State of Rajasthan and another part has arisen in consequence of this Act, and such discrimination must be struck down under article 14 of the Constitution. Consequently, we should declare Part IV of the Act ultra vires of the Constitution after the 26th of January 1950. Some other minor points were also raised on behalf of the various applicants, but we do not think it necessary for present purposes to refer to them as there is, in cur opinion, nothing in those points.

( 7 ) THE applications have been opposed on behalf of the State, and it is urged that the provisions contained in Part IV of the Act are not opposed to the provisions of the Constitution, and are not void. It is said that the object of the Act was to provide for relief of indebtedness, particularly of the tenantry, and the Debt conciliation Boards were established to fulfil this purpose. The Act, and particularly part IV, is, therefore, a progressive and ameliorative measure, and should be preserved even though it may not be in force in other parts of Rajasthan.

( 8 ) BEFORE we consider the relevant provisions of the Act and the arguments for and against its validity in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution, we should like to dispose of a point which arose during the course of arguments, and which was not raised in the applications. It was found that Section 1, Sub-section (2) of the Act, which provided for the application of the Act, had made no mention of Part IV at all. It was, therefore, felt that Part IV might never have been brought into force because it was omitted from the section applying the Act. We, therefore, sent for the original Council Resolution No. 9, dated 11th of August 1941, to find out whether this omission of Part IV from Section 1 (2) was deliberate or only a misprint. We found that in the Council Resolution Part IV was to come into force over the whole of the State except the Sambhar Shamlat area just like Parts III, v, VI and VII, so that the omission of Part IV in the section in the Gazette in which the Act was published was a misprint. This is also borne out by the fact that the authorised Hindi translation, which was also published in the Gazette on the same day, contained the mention of Part IV as extending to the whole of Marwar except the Sambhar Shamlat area along with Part






























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