1983 Supreme(Raj) 337
RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT AT JAIPUR BENCH
N.M.Ksliwal, J.
M/s. Prem Tent House - Appellant
Versus
Parkash Chand Jain - Respondent
S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 73 of 1983.
Decided On : 11-04-1983
For the Appellant:Shri L.R. Mehta and G.C. Lunia, Advocates.
For the Respondent:Shri R.K. Rastogi, Advocate.
The Court held that the lower Courts had considered the question of partial eviction under Section 14(2) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 and found that the plaintiff-respondent required the entire suit premises for his office and residence.
Headnote:
EVICTION - RAJASTHAN PREMISES (CONTROL OF RENT AND EVICTION) ACT, 1950 - SECTION 14(2) - PARTIAL EVICTION - REASONABLE AND BONA FIDE PERSONAL NECESSITY - COMPARATIVE HARDSHIP - INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff-respondent, a practicing Advocate, filed a suit for eviction of the defendant-appellant from the suit premises on the ground of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity for his office and residence. The lower Courts decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff-respondent.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the finding of the lower Courts on the question of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity and comparative hardship was unassailable and binding in second appeal. The Court also held that there was no necessity to remand the case on the point of partial eviction as the plaintiff-respondent required the entire suit premises for his office and residence.
Issues: 1. Whether the lower Courts erred in not considering the question of partial eviction under Section 14(2) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950? 2. Whether the finding of the lower Courts on the question of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity and comparative hardship was sustainable?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 14(2) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 mandates the Court to consider the question of partial eviction if no hardship would be caused to either the tenant or the landlord. 2. The Court held that the lower Courts had considered the question of partial eviction and found that the plaintiff-respondent required the entire suit premises for his office and residence. The Court also held that the finding of the lower Courts on the question of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity and comparative hardship was based on evidence and was not perverse.
Final Decision: The High Court dismissed the second appeal filed by the defendant-appellant.
JUDGMENT
1. - This Civil second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur, dated February 10, 1983, affirming the judgment and decree of Civil Judge City, Jaipur, dated July 5, 1982 in a suit for eviction.
2. The plaintiff-respondent had filed a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity, default in payment of rent and material alterations. Both the lower Courts have passed a decree for eviction holding the question of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. During the pendency of first appeal before learned District Judge, the defendant-appellant had submitted an application for amendment in the written statement. The said application was dismissed by learned District Judge by order, dated November 20, 1982. The defendant filed a revision petition in this Court against the order, dated November 20, 1982. The said revision petition was dismissed by Hon'ble Sidhu, J. on merits on January 6, 1983. The defendant has alleged in the grounds of second appeal that he had submitted petition for special leave before January 6, 1983. Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition but reserved the liberty to the defendant to argue the question as regards the legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Judge dismissing the application for amendment of the written statement in any proceedings which may be brought to Hon'ble Supreme Court against the final order passed by the High Court. Mr. Lekh Raj Mehta, learned counsel, appearing for the defendant-appellant frankly conceded that so far as this Court was concerned the order, dated January 6, 1983 dismissing the revision petition against the order of the District Judge dated November 20, 1982, had become final and the defendant-appellant was not entitled to raise any ground in the second appeal regarding the propriety of the order passed by the District Judge, dated November 20, 1982.
3. Mr. Mehta then tried to assail the finding of learned District Judge on the question on reasonable and bonafide personal necessity and the question of comparative hardship but was unable to persue it as these question were questions of fact and were binding in this Court in second appeal. I am also clearly of the opinion that learned District Judge has discussed the entire evidence on these points and has committed no error in arriving at the conclusion that the suit premises were required reasonably and bonafidely for the personal necessity of the plaintiff-respondent and the question of comparative hardship was also in his favour. Learned District Judge in this regard has considered all aspects of the case and has given cogent reason in support of the finding given on these issues. Mr. Mehta, however, paid great emphasis on the point that the lower appellate Court failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of the following provision of Section 14(2) the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950 :Section 14(2) "Where the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in-respect of part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only." It was argued that even if no plea was taken by the defendant-appellant in the written statement, it was incumbent on the Court to record a finding and as no specific issue was raised in this regard, the case should be remanded for giving an opportunity to the defendant-appellant on this point. Mr. Mehta in this regard placed reliance on an order, dated April 9, 1981 passed in (I) Ugamraj Pannalal v. Dhanna Lal, S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 82 of 1981, decided on 9.4.1981 Dhund Singh v. Smt. Satwant Kaur, Civil Second Appeal No. 16 of 1979, decided on 22.9.1980, Firm Loonaram Sohanlal v. Smt. Pushpa Devi S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 53 of 1982, decided on 15.4.1982. Seema Sandesh and others v. Smt
Click Here to Read the rest of this document