A guilty plea must be made voluntarily, after proper advice, and with full understanding of the consequences. The defendant must have real notice of the true nature of the charge against him.

1. SUMMARYUpon advice of his attorneys, the defendant, in a state trial court in Fulton County, New York, pleaded guilty to a charge of second-degree murder and was convicted on that charge. After having exhausted his state remedies, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging, insofar as relevant, that his plea was involuntary because he was not aware that intent to cause death was an element of the offence. After protracted proceedings in the District Court, that court held as a matter of law in favour of the defendant-petitioner. This holding was affirmed, without opinion, by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (516 F2d 897).On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court also affirmed. In an opinion by Stevens, J., expressing the view of seven members of the court, it was held that the judgment of conviction was entered without due process of law, since the defendant-petitioner' s plea of guilty was involuntary in that he did not receive adequate notice of the offence.White, J., joined by Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., concurred, expressing the view that the defendant' s factual guilt of second-degree murder had never been established in any fashion permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, Ch. J., dissented on the ground that, as shown by the totality of circumstances, the defendant pleaded guilty upon the advice of competent counsel and his plea was voluntary as a matter of constitutional law. OPINION OF THE COURTMr. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.The question presented is whether a defendant may enter a voluntary plea of guilty to a charge of second-degree murder without being informed that intent to cause the death of his victim was an element of the offence.

2. The case arises out of a collateral attack on a judgment entered by a state trial court in Fulton County, New York in 1965. Respondent, having been indicted on a charge of first-degree murder, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 25 years to life. He did not appeal.

3. In 1970, respondent initiated proceedings in the New York courts seeking to have his conviction vacated on the ground that his plea of guilty was involuntary. The state courts denied relief on the basis of the written record. 2 Having exhausted his state remedies, 3 in 1973, respondent filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. 4 He alleged that his guilty plea was involuntary because he was not aware 1 of the sentence that might be imposed upon conviction of second- degree murder, or 2 that intent to cause death was an element of the offence. Based on the state court record, the Federal District Court denied relief. The Court of Appeals reversed summarily and directed the District Court "to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised by petitioner, including whether, at the time of his guilty plea, he was aware that intent was an essential element of the crime and was advised of the scope of the punishment that might be imposed."

1. On August 7, 1970, he filed both a "Notice of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea" and Q "Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis."

2. The written record included the transcript of his original arraignment on the first-degree murder charge on April 15, 1965, transcript of proceedings relating to the impaneling of a jury on June 7, 1965, transcript of the proceedings on June 8, 1965, when he pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, the sentencing hearing on June 15, 1965, an affidavit by the prosecutor and certain psychological evaluations of respondent.

3. The order denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis was entered by the Trial Division of the Supreme Court of New York on May 29, 1971. On March 7, 1972, the Appellate Division affirmed witho