The main legal point established in the judgment is that the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not be exercised in favor of a party who has already availed the remedy of a civil suit, and that the petitioners should have pursued their remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

1. - By this joint writ petition petitioners have challenged orders dated 12.4.1989 and 13.6.1989 regarding their retrenchment from service.

2. According to the petitioners the Executive Director(Traffic) Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation "herein-after referred to as 'the Corporation' issued a circular letter dated 9th March, 1989 that services of all the conductors appointed after 1.4.1987 and working on different regions be terminated/retrenched with immediate effect. The Regional Manager of the Corporation of Ajmer region passed order dated 12.4.1989 for retrenchment of 50 conductors including the petitioners. According to this order services of the conductors mentioned therein were terminated w.e.f. 22.4.1989.

3. The petitioners had filed a civil suit and an injunction order passed in their favour against termination of their service. That was subsequently vacated on 2.6.1990. According to the petitioners suit was later on withdrawn with liberty to file writ petition before the Hon'ble Court. Thereafter respondents No. 2 issued another order dated 13th June, 1989 for giving effect to the retrenchment.

4. The petitioners have challenged the order of retrenchment on the ground that there has been a violation of section 25(G) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in as much as persons junior to the petitioners, whose names have been given in para 6, have been retained in service. According to the petitioners, Ram-niwal, Dungar Ram, Hersukh, Gopal Lal s/o Hanuman Sahai, Gopal Lal s/o Bal Chand, Rajendra Singh Rathore and Nand Lal were appointed on probation by order dated 16th January, 1988. and he was appointed on 9.3.1987. His.service was unlawfully terminated after 10 days and he was given fresh appointment on 22.5.1987. He was illegally retrenched on 16.7.1988. He filed writ petition No. 2529/1988 which was allowed on 30.11.1988 and he was ordered to be reinstated with all consequential benefits. Regarding other petitioners also facts have been given to show that they were given appointment, they were retrenched and were reinstated under the orders of the High Court. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, vacancies in the cadre of conductors are still available and yet the services of the petitioners have been terminated. It has also been alleged that state wise seniority list of conductors has not been prepared by the respondent Corporation and yet services of the petitioners have been terminated.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioners was repeatedly asked as to what were the grounds in the civil suit for challenging the order of termination of the petitioners and what was the order for withdrawal of the suit but that order was not produced before the Court even during the course of hearing. It is clear that the petitioners had approached the civil court for relief against termination of their service. They did get an injunction in their favour. It was subsequently vacated by the civil Court. May be that one of the grounds given by the Civil Court for not continuing in the injunction was the availability of alternative remedy. The petitioner subsequently withdrew the suit having failed to get relief of injunction from the Civil Court. If the order granting permission to withdraw the suit had been produced before the Court, the real contents of the prayer made for with drawl would have been revealed to the Court. In my opinion, it is not open to a party to pursue a particular remedy and abandon it merely because interim relief is not granted by that Court. The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not to be exercised in favour of the party who has already availed remedy of the civil suit. Only in exceptional cases this Court will entertain a writ petition on behalf of the party who has already prosecuted the remedy of suit in Civil Court. It will be clearly an abuse of the process of the Court if a person first approaches the Civil Court and then approaches the High Court for invoking