1995 Supreme(Raj) 902
RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT AT JAIPUR BENCH
V.K.Singhal, J.
Timber Vyapar Sanchalan Samiti, Alwar - Appellant
Versus
State of Rajasthan & anr. - Respondent
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2 of 1991.
Decided On : 13-07-1995
The levy of market fee and license fee is valid if there is a quid pro quo, i.e., some service is rendered in return for the fee.
Headnote:
MARKET FEE - LEVY - SERVICES RENDERED - CORRELATION - RAJASTHAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET ACT, 1961 - SECTIONS 3, 7, 14, 17, 18, 19 - INTERPRETATION - COURT HELD THAT THE LEVY OF MARKET FEE AND LICENSE FEE IS VALID AS THE ACT PROVIDES FOR THE BETTER REGULATION OF BUYING AND SELLING OF MARKET PRODUCE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF MARKET FOR THE AGRICULTURE PRODUCE IN THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, an unregistered association, challenged the levy of market fee and license fee by the respondents, claiming that no services were rendered in return for the fees collected.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the levy of market fee and license fee was valid as the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1961 provided for the better regulation of buying and selling of market produce and establishment of market for the agriculture produce in the State of Rajasthan.
Issues: Whether the levy of market fee and license fee was valid in the absence of any services rendered by the respondents.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on various Supreme Court and High Court judgments to hold that a fee can be levied only if there is a quid pro quo, i.e., some service is rendered in return for the fee. However, in the present case, the court found that the Act provided for a number of services to be rendered by the market committee, and that the amount collected as fees was to be used for the purposes specified in the Act, including the provision of facilities for the traders. Therefore, the court held that the levy of fees was justified.
Final Decision: The writ petition was dismissed.
"(1) That the amount of fee realised must be earmarked for render- ing services to the licensees in the notified market area and a good and substantial portion of it must be shown to be expended for this purposes.
(2) That the services rendered to the licensees must be in relation to the transaction of purchase or sale of the agricultural produce.
(3) That while rendering services in the market area for the purpose of facilitating the transaction of purchase and sale with a view to achieve the objects of the marketing legislation it is not necessary to confer the whole of the benefit on the licensees but some special benefits must be conferred on them which have a direct, close and reasonable correlation between the licensees and the transactions.
(4) That while conferring some special benefits on the licensee, it is permissible to render such service in the market which may be in the general interest of all concerned with transactions taking place in the market.
(5) That spending the amount of market fees for the purpose of augmenting the agricultural produce, its facility of transport in villages and to provide other facilities meant mainly or exclusively for the benefit of the agriculturists is not permissible on the ground that such services in the long run go to increase the volume of transactions in the market ultimately benefiting the traders also. Such an indirect and remote benefit to the traders is in no sense a special benefit to them.
(6) That the element of quid pro quo may not be possible, or even necessary, to be established with arithmetical exactitude but even broadly and reasonably it must be established by the authorities who charge the fees that the amount is being spent for rendering services to those on whom falls the burden of the fee.
(7) At least a good and substantial portion of the amount collected on account of fees, may be in the neighbourhood of two-thirds or three fourths must be shown with reasonable certainty as being spent for rendering services of the kind mentioned above."
"In the cases before us we are not told that the fee collected from the petitioners for soaking husks is setapart for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the license. Nor is there any data placed before us by which the expenses incurred could be gauged. It was argued before us that for a simple fee for licence granted for carrying on an activity, no quid pro quo is needed. In such cases the fee will in fact be a tax and thus we are taken to the third category namely fee in the nature of a tax. The Corporation, in our view, cannot impose a tax in the guise of a fee.