The services of a probationer may be terminated without a show cause notice or an opportunity of hearing, and such termination is not subject to judicial review if it is based on unsatisfactory performance and does not cast any stigma on the employee.

1. - This special appeal filed under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, arises out of the order, dated 25th June, 1991, passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in S.B. Civil writ petition No. 1858/1991; whereby learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on merits.

2. The facts giving rise to the filling of this appeal briefly stated, are that in pursuance of the Advertisement issued by the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur vide Notification, dated 12th January, 1990, the petitioner-appellant applied for the post of PBX Operator. She was called for interview which was held at Jodhpur on 3rd March, 1990. Selection Committee interviewed the petitioner alongwith other eligible candidates. The petitioner-appellant was found suitable and appointed as PBX Operator at Jaipur Bench of this Court in the pay-scale of Rs. 950-1680 for period of six months on temporary basis vide order, dated 5th March, 1990 (Annex. 1). It was stated that the appellant was given extension in terms of her appointment upto 31st December, 1990 (first extension) and thereafter upto 28th February, 1991 (second extension) by another order. The appellant continued to work even after the expiry of period of second extension, i.e., after 28th February, 1991 but no formal order of extension was passed. Thereafter an order dated 26th March, 1991 was issued which was served upon her on 27th March, 1991 vide Annexure 4. By the said order of extension it was stipulated that the appellant who had been appointed as PBX Operator vide order, dated 5th March, 1990 has been granted extension in terms of her appointment upto 31st March, 1991 and no further extension would be granted beyond the said date, i.e., 31st March, 1991.

3. In terms of the aforesaid order the service of the appellant automatically stood terminated w.e.f. 1st April, 1991. It was contended that the aforesaid order which provides that no further extension would be granted to her after 31st March, 1991 and which seeks to terminate the services of the appellant thereafter, is absolutely arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and the appellant had accordingly prayed for quashing of the said order.

4. It has been contended in the appeal that no charge-sheet has ever been served upon the appellant and there was no complaint with regard to her work and conduct except the fact that only in the order, dated 11 January, 1991, last extension order Annexure 3, it was mentioned that she should improve her work and behaviour, failing which it may not be possible to extend the term of her temporary appointment. Vide order, dated 26th March, 1991 (Annex. 4) it was made explicitly clear that the term of temporary appointment of the appellant stood extended upto 31st March, 1991 only and no further extension was granted to her beyond the said date. Consequently the services of the appellant stood automaticallly terminated w.e.f. 1st April, 1991.

5. During the course of hearing of appeal it was contended by Shri K.K. Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant, that since the appellant had been appointed as PBX Operator in the High Court after due selection and since her services stood extended from time to time, her services could not have been terminated summarily by not extending her services beyond the period of extension already granted to her. It has been further contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the post of PBX Operator is a continuing post in the High Court and even after the termination of appellant's services, the work is being done by one Shri Alok Sharma who is only a lower division clerk and who is not even trained as PBX Operator and hence the termination order is totally unjustified inasmuch as no complaint with regard to unsatisfactory performance of her work was ever communicated to the appellant. It has been further contended by Shri K.K. Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant, that anot