A court has the discretion to strike out a tenant's defence for non-compliance with an order passed under Section 13(3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950, but this discretion should be exercised only in cases where the default is wilful and contumacious.

1. - This is a defendant-appellant's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 30.11.1981 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Kota in civil appeal No.14/81-103/81 upholding the judgment and decree dated 15-1-1981 passed by the learned Additional Munsif, No.2 (South), Kota in Civil Suit No.4/77 (62/79). The brief facts giving rise to this appeal are as under:

The plaintiff-respondent Moorti Mandir Ganeshji Dhanroopji had filed a suit for eviction of the defendant-appellant from the shop in dispute on the ground of non-payment of rent and of subletting. It was alleged in the plaint that the defendant- appellant was in arrears of rent w.e.f. 1.3.1979 and had committed default in payment of rent for a period of more than six months and also that he had sub-let the shop in dispute and had parted with its possession in favour of one Shri Prabhudas. The suit was contested by the defendant-appellant, who denied having sub-let the property in dispute to Prabhudas and also pleaded that he had tendered the rent for the relevant period to the plaintiff- respondent but the plaintiff-respondent had not accepted it. The learned trial Court determined the rent of the premises and passed an order dated 25.4.1977 under Sub-section (3) of Section 16 (sic Section 13) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (the Act) directing the defendant-appellant to pay the arrears of rent at the admitted rate of Rs. 15/- per month within 15 days from the date-of the said order and also to pay future rent month-by-month by 15th of each succeeding month. The defendant-appellant deposited the arrears of rent on 2.5.1977 and thereafter kept on depositing the rent at the agreed rate, but instead of depositing the rent for the month of May, 1978 by 15th of June, 1978, he deposited it on 10th of July, 1978. An application was moved by the plaintiff- respondent under Sub-section (5) of Section 13 of the Act stating that the defendant-appellant had failed to comply with the order passed, by the learned Court under Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act and praying that his defence against eviction should be struck-out. The application was opposed. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties vide order dated 21.5.1979, the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the rent for the month of May, 1978 was deposited late and, as such, the defence of the defendant-appellant was liable to be struck-out. He, consequently, passed the order striking-out the defence of the defendant-appellant. Thereafter the learned trial Court framed issues and recorded the statements of the plaintiff-respondent and without giving an opportunity to the defendant-appellant either to cross-examine the plaintiff or to produce the evidence in rebuttal, passed the decree of eviction against the defendant-appellant and in favour of the plaintiff-respondent on both the grounds above said. The appeal filed by the defendant appellant was dismissed by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Kota. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant-appellant has approached this Court by filing this appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code).

2. I have heard Shri K.K.Mehrish, the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, Shri J.S.Rastogi, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent and have also perused the record of the case.

3. It is not disputed before me that the right of a defendant to defend the suit is a very valuable right and it cannot be taken away except on strong grounds. In a Full Bench decision of this Court in Vishandas V/s Savitri Devil 1988 (1) RLR page 1 it has been held that a Court is not bound to strike out the defence as and when a tenant commits default in payment of rent in compliance with the order passed by the court under Subsection (3) of Section 13 of the Act and that the court has a discretion in the matter. Shri Mehrish has contended that there were summer vacations in the courts and, as such, the