The power conferred on the State Government by Sub-section (9A) of Section 86 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act, 1959 was not arbitrary, unbridled, or unreasonable. It was meant to serve larger public interest and was intended to be availed to meet the administrative exigencies.

1. - These appeals have been filed by the State of Rajasthan under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, against the judjement dated December 3, 1980 of the learned Single Judge of this Court, who has struck down Sub-section (9A) of Section 86 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act, 1959 (here in after referred to as 'the Act').

2. Sub-section (9A) of Section 86, confers on the State Government the power:

(i) to transfer any member of the service, known as the Rajasthan Panchayat Samiti and Zila Parishad Service from one Panchayat Samiti to another Panchayat Samiti, whether within the District or outside it; and

(ii) To stay the operation of or cancel, any order of transfer made under Sub-section (9) of the rules made there under.
This Sub-section in Section 86 of the Act was inserted by the Rajasthan Panchayat Laws (Amendment) Act, 1966 which was published in the Rajasthan Rajpatra dated April 6, 1966. In exercise of the powers conferred by the provisions of this Sub-section, the Government directed certain transfers of employees from one Panchayat Samiti to another. Some of the employees affected by such transfers filed writ petition in this court under Article 226 of the Constitution and challenged the order of transfer passed against them and also prayed that Subsection (9A) of Section 86 of the Act may be declared ultra vires the Constitution of India. The writ petitions were filed in 1980. Besides the State of Rajasthan, the writ petitioners also impleaded as respondents the concerned Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads. A joint return was filed on behalf of the State, the Panchayat Samiti and Zila Parishads and the writ petitions were contested by them alleging, inter-alia, that the orders of transfer were passed, not on account of any malice but due to the exigencies of administration.

3. A batch of 29 writ petitions was heard and disposed of by the learned Single Judge by a common judjement dated December 3, 1980. All contentions, except the one relating to the validity of Sub-section (9A) of Section 86, have been decided by the learned Single Judge against the writ petitioners. The learned Single Judge has held:

"That transfer order need not be a speaking order and the requirement for a speaking order cannot be insisted upon in the case of an order of transfer simpliciter, as contemplated by Section 86 Sub-section (9A) of the Act."
XXX XXX XXX XXX

"A perusal of the reply would show that although details and the reasons or circumstances leading to transfer were not given in each case but the respondents have consistently said that the transfers were made on account of administrative reasons and there was no malice against the petitioners. It would therefore, be unnecessary to examine each case and find out what were the reasons for transferring him. The transfers are made on administrative reasons and unless malafides are proved or it is shown that any extraneous considerations were responsible for same, the normal presumption were of administrative exigency and bonafides would hold the field."
The only argument, which prevailed with the learned Single Judge, is the one relating to the validity of Sub-section (9A) and on this aspect the learned Single Judge has held that this sub section was ultra vires, being hit by the vice of excessive delegation and also being in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. As a sequel to this, the learned Single Judge struck down Sub-section (9A) and also quashed the orders of transfer of the writ petitioner. Aggrieved by this, the State of Rajasthan has filed the present appeals. The writ petitioners have been arraigned as respondent No. 1 before us.

4. In these appeals we are concerned with the sole question as to whether Sub-section (9A) of Section 86 of the Act, is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution and suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. Before we answer this question we may briefly refer to the scheme and the relevant