The requirement prescribed by Section 25F(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a condition precedent for the retrenchment of a workman, and non-compliance with the said condition renders the impugned retrenchment invalid and inoperative.

1. - By this petition, petitioner Kishan Kumar seeks to quash the order Ex.3 dated November 17, 1975, by which his services were terminated. He has also prayed that he may be reinstated with all consequential benefits. Facts first.

2. The petitioner was appointed by order Ex.1 dated June 27, 1973 as temporary local substitute Khalasi under the Inspector of Works, Jodhpur in the scale of Rs. 70-85 (AS) on pay Rs. 70/- plus usual allowances. He joined on July 3, 1973. The petitioner along with others submitted representation Ex.2 dated May 8, 1975 for taking up his name in the regular panel. The petitioner continuously worked since July 3, 1973, until the notice Ex.3 dated November 17, 1975, in which it was stated that as the petitioner has not secured a position to come up within the vacancies arising upto May 1, 1973, his services would stand terminated on the date after one month of the issue of the notice. Subsequently, the petitioner's services were ordered to be terminated by letter (Ex 4) dated January 3, 1976, in which it was stated that his services stand terminated from January 3, 1976 and are no more required from that date. The case of the petitioner is that since he is a workman and had completed more than 240 day of service. the termination of his services without giving retrenchment benefit under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act (No. XIV of 1947) (for short 'the Act' herein after) is null and void and, therefore, it should be quashed and set aside. He, therefore, filed the writ petition on February 4, 1976 for the reliefs mentioned above.

3. On behalf of the Union of India (non-petitioner No. 1) and the Divisional Engineer, Northern Railway, Jodhpur (non-petitioner No. 2), reply dated November 9, 1979 was filed opposing the writ petition. It was contended in the reply that a screening test for the purpose of regular empanelment as per Rules was notified and it was specified that those casual labours substitutes who have completed 180 days upto May 1, 1973 will be screened. The notice has been produced marked as Annexure R/1. The screening took place on 7th and 8th May, 1975. The petitioner appeared but he failed. Consequently, he could not be empanelled and the empanelled candidates replaced him. This led to the termination of the services of the petitioner. It was admitted that the petitioner had completed service of 240 days but his services were terminated on his failure to be empanelled after screening under the Rules. No preference could be given to the petitioner over the empanelled candidates. The Act has no application. Along with the reply, Annexure R/2 was filed showing that the screening was done for the posts available upto December 31, 1975, in which the petitioner had failed.

4. I heard Mr. M.R. Singhvi, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. A.K. Mathur, learned Counsel for non-petitioners No. 1 and 2.

5. Mr. A.K. Mathur, learned Counsel has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition. It was contended by him that the petitioner should have pursued his remedy under the Act. He should have approached the competent authorities under the Act for the relief which he has prayed for in the writ petition In support of his contention, he relied on Premier Automobiles v. K.S. Wadke, AIR 1975 SC 2238 .

6. The preliminary objection regarding the non-maintainability of the writ petition was stoutly opposed by Mr. M.R. Singhvi, learned Counsel for the petitioner on the basis of Mahesh Chandra Sharma v. State of Rajasthan 1974 RLW 338 and Nagaur Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Kesa Ram 1979 WLN 408 .

7. I have considered the aforesaid decisions and have come to the conclusion that the preliminary objection should be over-ruled. A contention was raised in Mahesh Chandra's case 1974 RLW 338 that the petitioner had .an alternative remedy under the Act, which he should have pursued and, therefore, the writ petition should be dismissed on that ground. After