The central legal point established in the judgment is that the civil court does not have jurisdiction to deal with cases involving agricultural land and the encroachment issues.

1. - Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. A nuisance has been created by the Authorities in the Developing Town of Jaipur which is called the `Pink City' of the State of Rajasthan. Encroachment after encroachment are done now and then and illegally and irregularly constructions are made on the agricultural land without the conversion. The law of fragmentation of land is also violated now and then.

3. Section 91 A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, provides that the persons who used the agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes, can be ejected in accordance with the provisions of law. The State Government has a right, in lieu of having such person and the subsequent transferees so ejected from the land in question, allow him or them. as the case may be, to retain such land, use the same for any purpose other than that of agriculture on payment to the State Government, in addition to the urban assessment and premium payable under sub-section (4), of such fine by way of penalty as may be prescribed.

4. No order of conversion of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes has been passed by the Government or any of the competent authority of the State. The plaintiff and the defendant in having a similar case as far as the injunction order against the Jaipur Development Authority is concerned. The interest of Jaipur Development Authority is being jeopardised on account of non-application on the part of the J. D. A. who is leading to illegal constructions on the agricultural land. The Government may regularise it in an individual case but the question remains whether a blanket order can be passed under Section 91 A or not. As the penalty is to be imposed in an individual case and so I am not going to decide this question at the stage of revision petition. However, I will like to observe that in the instant case, it is an admitted position that a piece of land is an agricultural land and it has not been converted so far.

5. Shri Lunia submitted that conversion charges have been deposited but no order has been passed. Thus, it is altogether a different matter. The question still remains whether the Civil Court has a jurisdiction to deal with such cases or not. In the matter of agricultural land, the landlord is the owner, so the question of ownership does not survive at all.

6. Shri Lunia has cited before me the case of Murlidhar v. Krishi Upaj Mahdi Samiti, reported in RLW 1978, page 34 , and submitted that the plaintiff prayed in that case for the issuance of the permanent Injunction. He submits that the prayer for issuance of permanent injunction was based on title as well as on possession. Shri Lunia submits that he has also placed the title and possession both. He has also cited before me the case of Gauri Shanker v. Jabbar Singh and another (RLR 1984, page 316) and submits that this Court has decided that even those persons can be impleaded as party who set up a counter-claim to the interest and title of the plaintiff.

7. As far as both the cases are concerned, the proposition is not in dispute and it is within the discretion of the Court to add or not to add. However, this discretion should not be exercised arbitrarily. But in this case, it is an agricultural land and Shri Lunia submits that he has paid the conversion charges so the landlord is the State and the proceedings initiated by the Authorities who are the owners cannot be ejected (sic restrained) in any way specially by a Civil Court, when it is the agricultural land.

8. For this reason, I do not find force in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

9. The revision petition is dismissed summarily.Revision dismissed.

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