The court emphasized the need for conclusive evidence to prove adulteration under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, highlighting the unreliability of certain tests and the requirement for comprehensive testing.

1. This is a criminal appeal filed by the Municipal Council, Jaipur against the order of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Court No. 8. ,Jaipur City, acquitting the accused-respondents of charge under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, for selling adulterated mustered oil.

2. The prosecution case, briefly stated. is as follows:-

On 1116/1973, at about 11.45 a.m. the firm M/s. Chiranji Lal Ram Das situated in Johari Bazar, Jaipur was checked by the Food Inspector, Babu Lal. Accused Gauri Shankar was present in the shop and the Food Inspector after giving his introduction checked the shop and found 32 tins of refined mustered oil kept there for sale. The seal of one of the tins was got opened and the Food Inspector purchased 375 grams of refined mustered oil for analysis after paying Rs. 2 93 as cost. The oil was filled in three clean bottles which were corked, scaled and signed as per the procedure prescribed. One sample of bottle along with a copy of the memo in Form No. 6 was given to the accused. The remaining 31 tins were seized and were given to the accused for keeping them in safe custody. One of the sample was sent for analysis and after receiving the report when it was found to be adulterated the Food Inspector submitted his report to the President Municipal Council, Jaipur who after applying his mind granted sanction and, thereupon tho Food Inspector presented a complaint along with the sealed sample bottle in the Court of Munsif-Magistrate No. 1, Jaipur on 29/6/1973. On the application of the accused the Chief Public Analyst was also summoned and examined as a witness. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 342 Cr.P.C. (old) denied his presence at the time of taking the sample and, it was also stated that the signatures were taken when he reached there, after the sample had been taken and everything was over.

3. The prosecution case has been fully supported by PW/l Babu Lal, Food Inspector and two motbirs-PW/2 Mazid Khan and PW/3 Poorn Mal PW/4 Ashok Bhattacharya Chief Public Analyst has proved his report, Ex./P/8 and, has stated on oath that he had applied kries test for taking out the value of rancidity. He has further deposed that kries test is not 100% conclusive test for finding out the rancidity. He has further stated that, as per the examination of Central Food Laboratory, Calcutta, so far as known to him, free fatty acid in a sample found in prescribe limits the sample is not declared as rancid. According to Ex.1 P/8 free fatty acid is within the proscribed limit. He has also admitted that he did not take out peroxide value. In cross-examination he had further admitted that he had opined in Ex.P/8 that the sample was found to be rancid because the kries test was positive and that was the only reason why he had finally opined that the sample was adulterated, otherwise in all other aspects the sample was within the limits. The learned trial court after carefully examining the record of the case and considering the arguments of both the sides came to the conclusion that the alleged sample is within the prescribed limits of the standard of purity in all values except that it has been found to be rancid. Relying on the renounced book-Food Analysis. Theory and Practice by Bonarary & Maloan, the trial Court found that the kries test is not a reliable test for the purpose of rancidity and the other tests to find out whether the sample was rancid or not were not carried in the present case. Therefore, it found that the kries test is not conclusive test for rancidity and, hence, it cannot be said conclusively that the sample was rancid or adulterated. Hence, the accused-petitioner was acquitted of the offence under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. It is against this, judgment that the present appeal has been filed.

4. The learned counsel for the complainant-appellant has not been able to show any authority or a decision of any Court in