Delay in trial without progress for about 11 months violates the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.

1. - I have beard Mr. Mridul Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Public Prosecutor.

2. This is a bail application which has been filed by Laxman Singh for his release on bail pending trial of Sessions case No. 36/85 pending against him, in which he has been charged for the offence under Sections 302, 449 and 458, Indian Penal Code and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act. He moved before Sessions Court, Merta for the grant of bail but the Sessions Judge dismissed his application on 19th January, 1987. He has, therefore moved to this Court for grant of bail. The main contention of Mr. Mridul Jain is that charge had been framed against the petitioner by the Sessions Judge, Merta, on March 4, 1986 after the case had been committed to him by the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Merta on 19th December, 1985. The occurrence took place on 11th August, 1984. The petitioner was arrested on 20th September, 1985. Prior to that petitioner was absconding for more than one year, charge-sheet was filed before the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate in October, 1985 and the Magistrate had passed the committal order on 2nd November, 1985. It has been argued by Mr. Mridul Jain that the first date fixed for recording of prosecution evidence was 15th May, 1986 and till 11th March, 1987 i.e. for the last about 10 months, not a single witness has been examined by the prosecution in the Sessions case, pending before the Sessions Judge, Merta. The petitioner is already in jail for the last 11/2 years. It was contended that this fact alone entitles him to be released on bail because delay in trial without progress for about 11 months violates the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution to the petitioner as it deprives him of his personal liberty except in accordance with law. It was urged that provisions of the Cr. PC envisage speedy trial within a reasonable time and when the prosecution does not produce a single witness for about ten months, the petitioner becomes entitled to be released on bail and his fundamental right should be secured.

3. An interesting case came before the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Madheshwardhari Singh v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1986 Patna 326 , judgment in which was delivered by his Lordship S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J. to illustrative of the poets' hope of freedom slowly broadening down from precedent to precedent". The significant issues which necessitated reference to the Full Bench were formulated as under:

(1) Whether the fundamental right to a speedy public trial enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution by precedential mandate is confined to only offence or is attracted to all offences generically?

(2) Whether the aforesaid right to a speedy trial is applicable only to the proceedings in court strictest to sense or includes within its sweep the proceeding Police Investigation as well?

(3) Is a speedy trial equally mandated by both the letter and spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?

(4) Whether the ratios in Ramdaras Ahir's case (1985 Cr. LJ 584) and in Maksudan Singh's case AIR 1986 Patna 8) (FB) are applicable equally to all offences and irrespective of the fact whether the proceedings are a trial or an appeal against acquittal?

(5) Whether an outer time limit to concretise the right to a speedy public trial is envisioned by principle of precedent?

4. His Lordship observed in para 9 of the reported judgment that in all criminal prosecutions, the rights to a speedy public trial is now an inalienable fundamental right of the citizen under Article 21 of our Constitution. That cannot be allowed to be whittled down on any whims ground of the horry origin of this right in the constitutional history of Great Britain and America nor considerations of affluence of developed countries are even remotely relevant or germane in this context. That this right to speedy trial delves deeply into the soul and spirit of the Anglo-American jurisprudence (which we have either i