The central legal point established in the judgment is the importance of considering the plain meaning of statutory provisions and the legislative history to determine the existence of a mistake apparent from the record in tax-related matters.

1. - This revision is against the judgment dated 30.6.1993 passed by the Rajasthan Sales Tax Tribunal, Ajmer in respect of assessment year 1988-89. The order relates to rejection of rectification application moved by the petitioner for rectifying the mistake which is alleged to be apparent from record.

2. The brief facts and circumstances in which the present case arises as noticed in the order passed by the Rajasthan Sales Tax Tribunal dated 15.12.1992 are that there was a works contract between appellant dealer and the B.H.E.L. for the fabrication of Cupro-Nickle-Tubes. The appellant dealer did the job work in respect of the fabrication of the above tubes and supplied the same to the B.H.E.L. prior to 22.4.1988. The dealer in fabrication of the said tubes used Nickle valued Rs. 2,47,987/-. The other commodities used in execution of the said works contract were supplied by the B.H.E.L. for whom the job was executed. The assessing authority held that in execution of the works contract property in Nickle worth Rs. 2,47,987/-passed on to B.H.E.L. and it amounted to sale of Nickle by the petitioner-dealer. He, therefore, levied tax on the sales of Nickle at said amount and interest under section 11B on the additional demand. He also levied penalty under Sections 16(1)(i) and 16(1)(e) amounting to Rs. 37,500/-. The amount on account of penalty under section 16(1)(e) included penalty for violation of the provisions in respect of Nickle as well as in respect of sale of other electrical goods as raw-material. By its order dated 15.12.1992 the Tribunal had rejected the plea of the assessee that transfer of property in goods used in execution of works contract about fabrication of any goods prior to 22.4.1988 was not eligible to tax because fabrication works was not included in definition of works contract prior to 22.4.1988. Tribunal was of the view that definition of works contract was always there, relying on the Judgment of this Court in M/s. Sood Enterprises's case in D.B. Civil Writ No. 1698/89 decided on 18.11.1990, according to which two definitions of works contract during the intervening period, Sections 2(e) and 2(u), were in existence. There was no hiatus and tax could have been levied, even prior to that in respect of goods involved in execution of works contract. However the Tribunal. deleted penalty under section 16(1)(i) and tax on the packing material. Penalty under section 16(1)(e) was also deleted in respect of turn over of Nickle in question but sustained penalty under section 16(1)(e) in respect of sale of electrical goods as raw-material. Thus it partly allowed the appeal of the assessee.

3. The assessee filed a rectification application alleging that there was a mistake apparent on the face of record inasmuch as from the perusal of the statutory provisions as were applicable prior to 22.4.1988 the Fabrication contract in question did not fall within the ambit and scope of term works contract falling within the ambit of tax levy. That application has been rejected by the order under revision on the ground that jurisdiction of Tribunal in respect Of rectification of its own order being limited, and noticing the relevant legislative changes and the definitions, it held that it was not a case of mistake apparent from the record, but is question of elaborate arguments on the issue on which Tribunal was persuaded to take one opinion.

4. In the first instance it needs to be clarified that while considering rectification application distinction has to be kept in mind between the case where consideration of conceivably two rival opinions is required to be evaluated before reaching the conclusion about the alleged error in the order which has already come into existence on the one hand and the case where for the purpose of finding the existence of any error, mere reference has to be made to different provision of law whose meaning is clear and unambiguous. In the former case consideration of opinions or contentions o