The court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law in a petition under Article 226, and the exercise of jurisdiction is discretionary, but must be based on sound judicial principles.

1. - Heard learned counsel for both the parties.

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 23.11.1992 by which the petition filed by the petitioner, challenging the attachment of the property in respect of alleged dues has been dismissed inter alia on the ground that the petition raise disputed questions of fact.

3. The petitioner has challenged the attachment of his property in connection with the recovery of alleged out standing dues against respondent No. 5 Gram Sewa Sahkari Samiti Bakhi vide Annexurc 3 in which it has been seated that the house has been attached on 5.10.1987, in which the petitioner has re-entered and he was required to vacate the same.

4. It is true that the jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 is discretionary and in a given circumstances where enquiry into complex facts, pleading and allegation needing collection of evidence through a regular trial is required, the court may refuse to entertain the petition and relegate the litigant to remedies where such questions can be properly determined. This is not because the court lacks jurisdiction to determine such questions or decide even disputed questions of fact but because as a matter of self-restraint on well recognised principles for exercising of discretion in the matter inviting invoking of extra ordinary jurisdiction, the court resist from going into such enquiry as a trial court. Ondinarily, whether the petition raises disputed questions of fact or not can only be known after other sides gets an opportunity to reply and facts alleged in the application are denied. It is one thing to say that the petition involves enquiry into complex facts for which the petition may not be appropriate forum. It is another thing to say that the petition raises disputed questions of fact on the assumption that the facts alleged by the petitioner may be disputed by the other side. In this connection, the attention can be invited in the principle evolved by the court in Gunwant Kaur Vs. Bhatinda Municipality (AIR 1970 SC 802) in which the court has held that : The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner's right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is, it is true, discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises questions of fact of a complex nature, which may for their determination reqire oral evidence to be taken, of the view that the disute may not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition. Rejection of a petition in limine will normally be justified, where the High Court is of the view that the petition is frivolous or because of the nature of the claim made, dispute sought to be agitated, or that the petition against the party against who relief is claimed is not maintainable or that the dispute raised thereby is such that it would be in appropriate to try it in the writ jurisdiction, or for analogous reasons.

5. It was a case in which the petitioner had challenged the land acquisition proceedings inter alia on the ground that the petitioner has not been given any opportunity of hearing under Sub-Section (5A) of the Land Acquisition Act. The High Court had dismissed the petition in limine on the ground that since the declaration under Section recorded about the existence' of public interest for which the property could be acquired after hearing the claimants, it raised disputed questions of fact. The Court finding that no notification under Section 17 (1) has been issued dispensing with the enquiry and the petitioner has right to challenge the validity of notification under the Land Acquisition Act, there being no remedy of suit held that the High Court was not justified in dismissing the p