An employer may dismiss an employee convicted in criminal proceedings without a hearing if the Standing Order specifically provides for such dismissal and the employer considers that it is necessary to meet the ends of justice.

1. - The Petitioner was employed as a conductor in the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (for short 'the Corporation' hereinafter).

2. On June 17, 1982 he was removed from service on the basis of the conviction for an offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code for which he was sentenced to three years imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. The conviction was maintained by the High Court in an appeal. In the order removing the petitioner from service, it was observed that a convicted employee cannot be kept in employment under the Orders of the State Government and therefore, the petitioner's services were terminated.

3. The petitioner contends that the order is bad because it has been passed without complying with the provisions of the Standing Order which requires an enquiry to be held before terminating the services of an employee. It is also contended that since the petitioner had not been given any opportunity of hearing before the order was passed, the principles of natural justice were violated. The decision of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Union of India, 1974 RLR 171 , Satya Dev Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (1994 Lab IC NOC 426) and that of the Supreme Court in The Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway v. T.R. Challappan, AIR (1976-I-LLJ-68) , Town Area Committee, Jalalabad v. Jag-dish Prasad (AIR 1978 SC 1407) and Shankar Das v. Union of India, (1985-II- LLJ-184) were cited in support of his case by the petitioner.

4. On the other hand the respondent's contention is that the Standing Order applicable to the petitioner's services specifically provided for dismissal from service of an employee who has been found guilty in criminal proceedings. It was contended that it was a simple discharge and not a punitive order.

5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, I have reached the conclusion that this petition has no force. It is not disputed that the petitioner was convicted of the offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The Standing Order 36(vi)(c) applicable to the employment of the petitioner provided that if on the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, the workman is found guilty of the charge and it is considered that an order of dismissal may meet the ends of justice, the employer shall pass orders accordingly.

6. It is contended that the word 'considered' in the provision would simply mean consideration after hearing the workman as the ultimate order may affect him prejudicially.

7. In Kuldeep Singh's case, a Division bench of this Court was considering a case of an employee who was convicted but released of probation. Provisions of Article 311(2)(a) also applied to the case and it was in these circumstances decided that where the rule enjoins on punishing authority to consider the circumstances of the case, principles of natural justice would apply. The decision is distinguishable on facts. Here the petitioner has not been released on probation and the rule does not provide that the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit. In the present case, the Standing Order provides that whenever a workman has been found guilty and is convicted and it is considered that an order of dismissal may meet the ends of justice, the employer shall pass the orders accordingly. The Standing Order obviously permits the employer to dismiss a convicted employee if his dismissal is considered to be necessary to meet the ends of justice. The only thing to be considered is whether looking to the conviction, the petitioner should be dismissed or not. It is a policy decision to be taken by the employer whether he would continue such a convicted employee in service or not.

8. In T.R. Challappan's case (supra), again the case was of an employee who was convicted but was granted benefit of probation. The relevant Rules in that case did not pro