In a petition for restitution of conjugal rights, the burden of proof is on the petitioner to establish that he or she has undergone a genuine change of heart and that the respondent has deserted him or her without any reasonable excuse.

1. - This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Jodhpur, dated May 12, 1980, whereby the appellant's petition for restitution of conjugal rights and in the alternative for judicial separation or divorce, was dismissed.

2. It appears that the relations between the parties became strained since April, 1964, which resulted into not only in various matrimonial cases between the parties, but they also resulted into various other litigations as well. In the matrimonial cases the present appeal appears to be the fourth inning in this Court. The appellant has been unsuccessful previously in his petitions for restitution of conjugal rights and for judicial separation and in petition for divorce. The first petition for restitution of conjugal rights was dismissed by the trial court on 11-1-1965 and his appeal against that decree of dismissal was also unsuccessful. Thereafter his petition for judicial separation was dismissed by the trial court on 25-8-1969 and his appeal was dismissed by this court on 9-5-1972. The appellant thereafter presented a petition for divorce. That too ended in dismissal on 16-8-1978. His appeal was also dismissed by this Court on 28-3-1979. The appellant further preferred a special appeal. That too was dismissed on 18-1-1980 and it is stated at the Bar by the learned counsel for the parties that the appellant chose to present a petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court against the judgment of this Court passed in special appeal, but his official leave petition was also rejected by the Supreme Court. The appellant had been praying for the reliefs for restitution of conjugal rights or for judicial separation or for divorce on the ground that the respondent Smt. Sushila his wife, has left the company of the appellant without any reasonable excuse and has deserted him.

3. The present petition for restitution of conjugal rights was ailed by the appellant on 24-11-1978, about three months after the dismissal of his petition for divorce. The appellant averred in the petition that within two years prior to the presentation of the petition, the appellant has reformed himself and has completely changed himself. After dismissal of the divorce petition, he received a letter dated 18-10-1978 (Ex. I) from the respondent wherein she expressed her desire for reunion. He sent a reply dated 25-10-1978 (Ex. 2) to that letter, in which the appellant completely surrendered himself and responded to the desire of the respondent. He expressed that the past events have been forgotten and he may be forgiven. He further received an- other letter dated 5-11-1978 (Ex. 5), in which the respondent suggested the ways and methods whereby the reunion between the two, may be possible. The appellant, thus, having shown that there has been a change of heart and that he repents for the past action and he further offered all possible assurance for a happy life, prayed for a decree for restitution of conjugal rights and in case it is found that the respondent is adamant to live separately and not to join with the appellant, then either a decree for judicial separation or divorce may be passed on the ground of desertion.

4. Reply to the petition was filed by the respondent, in which the grounds on which decree for restitution of conjugal rights or in the alternative decree for judicial separation or for divorce has been sought, were traversed and it was stated that there was no genuine desire on the part of the appellant for reunion. On the contrary she alleged that the appellant's action, conduct and deeds had been such which belie that there has been any change in the appellant or that any reformation has taken place in him. The respondent in her reply referred to the past relations between the parties and the litigations, which have arisen between them. It was alleged that the petition for restitution of conjugal rights is simply a device, so that the appellant may subsequently obtain a